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I. INTRODUCTION
With the adoption of the Equal Access to Justice Act,' Congress
created a new exception to the American rule that requires each party
to bear its own expenses for legal representation. A successful litigant
is now entitled to compensation for attorney's fees incurred in a civil
action against the United States, if the requirements of the Act are
otherwise met.' In addition, fees may be recovered for representation in
some administrative proceedings in which the federal government plays
an adversarial role.3
A significant portion of the docket of the federal courts is occupied
by appeals by claimants for social security benefits.' These claimants
have been denied disability or retirement benefits in nonadversarial ad-
ministrative adjudications before the Social Security Administration.
They have appealed to the federal courts for review on the administra-
tive record. In increasing numbers, the courts have been considering
claims for attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act arising
out of these social security appeals.6 Because there is no de novo, evi-
dentiary hearing in a social security appeal, the courts have struggled
to apply the provisions of the Equal Access to Justice Act to fee claims
arising out of successful appeals.
1. 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1982); 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1982). While this article was awaiting publica-
tion, the Act expired pursuant to its "sunset provision." See infra note 15 and accompanying text.
A reauthorization bill, H.R. 5479, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), containing relatively minor
amendments to the Act and eliminating the sunset provision, passed the House and Senate on
October 11, 1984. See 130 CONG. REc. H12171-74 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984). The bill, however,
was vetoed by President Reagan on November 8, 1984. President's Memorandum of Disapproval
of H.R. 5479, 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1814 (Nov. 12, 1984). The President objected to
provisions in the reauthorization bill that would have required that the agency's underlying action
be substantially justified before a party could be denied fees. See generally infra notes 159-76 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the effect of expiration of the Act on litigation pending on
the sunset date, see infra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
It is anticipated that a reauthorization bill again will be presented in the 97th Congress. See
Nat'l L.J., Nov. 26, 1984, at 3, col. 1. President Reagan's message indicated that he would make
permanent and retroactive reauthorization of the Act a high legislative priority. President's Mem-
orandum of Disapproval of H.R. 5479, 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1814, 1815 (Nov. 12,
1984).
2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2412(b), (d) (1982).
3. 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1982).
4. See Heaney, Why the High Rate of Reversals in Social Security Disability Cases?, 7
HAMLINE L. REV. 1 (1984).
5. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT ON REQUESTS FOR FEES AND
EXPENSES UNDER THE EQUAL AccEsS TO JUSTICE ACT OF 1980, OCTOBER 1, 1982 THROUGH
JUNE 30, 1983 (Sept. 23, 1983); ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT ON RE-
QUESTS FOR FEES AND EXPENSES UNDER THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT OF 1980, OCTOBER,
1981 THROUGH JUNE 30, 1982 (Sept. 22, 1982).
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A court must reverse a decision of the Social Security Administra-
tion to deny a claimant benefits if the court ultimately finds that there
is no "substantial evidence" in the administrative record to support the
Agency's decision.6 Once the court reverses, it must award fees to a
litigant if no "substantial justification" for the government position is
shown .The similarity between these two standards lies at the heart of
the difficulty facing courts seeking to apply the Equal Access to Justice
Act to social security litigants. This article will identify issues that have
arisen in applying the Act to successful claimants. A model by which
fee claims arising from social security appeals may be analyzed will be
proposed.
II. THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT
Prior to 1981, a party prevailing in a civil action against the
United States could only recover court costs expended in the litigation.8
Fees paid by the successful litigant to his attorney could not be recov-
ered. This was in keeping with the general American rule, requiring
each party to bear its own litigation costs.9 Even the narrow exceptions
to the American rule created by statute and through litigation gener-
ally were not available to a litigant against the federal government.' °
Through the Equal Access to Justice Act, adopted as a rider to the
Small Business Export Expansion Act of 1980,11 Congress sought to
open the door partially to fee awards against the federal government.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(A) (1982).
8. Recovery of costs was pursuant to Act of July 18, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-507, 80 Stat. 308,
now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a) (1982).
9. The American rule contrasts to the English, under which attorney's fees are awarded to
the prevailing party as an expense of litigation. See generally Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539,
543-46 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 1908 (1984); Note, Attorney Fees: Exceptions to
the American Rule, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 717 (1976).
10. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). A few statutory
exceptions to the American rule did permit fee recoveries against the United States. See notes 71-
73 infra and accompanying text.
11. Small Business Export Expansion Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, tit. II, §§ 201-208, 94 Stat.
2325 (1980) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1982), 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1982)). See generally Dods &
Kennedy, The Equal Access to Justice Act, 50 UMKC L. REV. 48 (1981); Janes, The Equal
Access to Justice Act: When Will It Permit Recovery of Attorneys' Fees?, 56 J. TAX'N 164
(1982); Robertson & Fowler, Recovering Attorneys' Fees from the Government Under the Equal
Access to Justice Act, 56 TUL. L. REV. 903 (1982); Note, The Award of Attorney's Fees Under
the Equal Access to Justice Act, II HOFSTRA L. REV. 307 (1982); Note, The Equal Access to
Justice Act: How to Recover Attorneys' Fees & Litigation Expenses from the United States Gov-
ernment, 13 U. TOL. L. REV. 149 (1981); Note, Attorney's Fees-Recovery of Attorney's Fees
Against the United States-The Equal Access to Justice Act, 10 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 723 (1983).
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Fees were to be awarded to successful litigants when the government
would be liable under common law12 and, in certain circumstances,
when the government was shown to have advocated a position that was
not "substantially justified."13 The Act was frankly viewed as experi-
mental. 4 To that end, the section of the Act creating a right to fees if
the government position was not substantially justified contained a
"sunset provision." On October 1, 1984, that section was to expire. 15 In
the interim, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts was
directed to prepare annual reports about claims under the Act, to per-
mit Congress to evaluate its impact."0
A. Fees Authorized by Common Law
Unless expressly prohibited by statute, the Act permits an award
of attorney's fees against the United States, its agencies, and its offi-
cials acting in their official capacity. However, the United States is
only liable for the fees and expenses of the opposing party to the same
extent that a party would be liable under the common law or any stat-
ute providing for such an award.
Two significant common-law exceptions to the American rule have
been identified. First, a party who acted in bad faith, either in the
course of litigation or in the conduct that gave rise to the litigation,
may be liable for fees.' 8 This exception is intended to discourage bad
faith conduct and to compensate the innocent litigant for his expenses
resulting from the conduct. Second, a party may be entitled to attor-
ney's fees for litigation that creates, increases, or protects a fund from
which nonparties will benefit. 9 Here, the goal is to avoid unjustly en-
riching those who have not actively participated, at the expense of
those who hired counsel to litigate. Fees have been awarded even when
the benefits conferred on nonparties are not pecuniary.2
12. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1982).
13. Id. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
14. See HR. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4984, 4992.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 note (1982). See 5 U.S.C. § 504 note (1982) (administrative proceed-
ings); see also supra note 1.
16. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(5) (1982).
17. Id. § 2412(b).
18. See, e.g., F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116,
129 (1974); Bell v. School Bd., 321 F.2d 494, 500 (4th Cir. 1963).
19. See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472 (1980). See generally Dawson, Law-
yers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees from Funds, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1597 (1974).
20. Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
[Vol. 7:355
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B. Fees Where the Government Position Lacks Substantial
Justification
The Equal Access to Justice Act not only permits a recovery of
fees against the government where recovery would be permitted against
a private litigant at common law; it also grants successful civil litigants
a special right to fees against the United States, federal agencies, and
officials. A prevailing party is entitled to fees and other expenses in-
curred in any civil action against the federal government, unless the
court finds that the government position was substantially justified.21
The court may deny fees, however, if special circumstances make an
award unjust.22
Parties of substantial wealth are excluded from the benefits of this
provision of the Act. To be eligible for fees, an individual party must
have a net worth of no more than $1,000,000. Organizational parties
are limited to a net worth of $5,000,000, although certain tax exempt
organizations are not bound by this restriction. Organizations having
more than 500 employees are also barred from recovering fees.23
As well as permitting awards of attorney's fees, the Act provides
compensation for the reasonable expenses of expert witnesses, and for
the reasonable expenses for studies and reports necessary for the prepa-
ration of the case. Compensation is based on prevailing market rates.
Attorney's fees may not exceed $75 per hour, unless the court deter-
mined that an increase in the cost of living or some other special factor
mandates a higher fee.24
The legislative history indicates that Congress intended the Equal
Access to Justice Act to provide a middle ground between the virtually
automatic award of fees granted to prevailing litigants in civil rights
actions and the restrictive requirement of the "bad faith" standard.
Not all successful litigants should be awarded fees. However, the
21. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1982).
22. Id.
23. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (1982). Some uncertainty surrounds the disqualifying provi-
sions for organizational parties. The comparable provision under the Administrative Procedures
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(B) (1982), excludes from coverage organizations exceeding the net
worth limit and those exceeding the ceiling on number of employees; 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B)
includes those under the net worth limit or under the size limit. Thus, an organization having
resources in excess of $5,000,000 but fewer that 500 employees is apparently eligible for fees for
civil litigation, but not for fees for administrative proceedings. This is apparently a drafting error
that should be resolved in favor of the language in the Administrative Procedures Act. See Rob-
ertson & Fowler, supra note 11, at 927-28.
24. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (1982). See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
EPA, 703 F.2d 700, 713 (3d Cir. 1983) (granting cost of living adjustment).
1984] 359
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award of fees to a prevailing party is not to be an extraordinary
event. 5 Rule 37(a)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
apportions discovery expenses, provided the model for the language
chosen. The advisory committee's report accompanying rule 37 indi-
cated that the committee chose that language to clarify that "expenses
should ordinarily be awarded [to the prevailing party] unless a court
finds that the losing party acted justifiably in carrying his point to
court." 6 As the House report indicates, this language was adopted into
the Equal Access to Justice Act to address the same concern that had
prompted the revision to rule 37: the reluctance of courts to award
fees.17
Both the statute and its legislative history indicate that the draft-
ers of the Equal Access to Justice Act paid heed primarily to fees and
expenses arising out of litigation characterized by adversary evidentiary
hearings. Expenses are to be reimbursed for "expert witnesses" and for
reports necessary "for the preparation of the party's case."2 8 The
House report suggested that certain dispositions, such as judgment on
the pleadings or a directed verdict, might indicate a lack of substantial
justification. 9 These dispositions, however, arise in matters to be tried
by an evidentiary hearing before the court. Although coverage of the
appeals of administrative adjudications was contemplated,"0 the full
import of the Act on such litigation was not considered. This omission
gives rise to persistant difficulties in applying the Act to social security
benefit denials appealed to the federal courts.
C. Fees in Administrative Proceedings
The Act provides for attorney's fees awards in some administrative
proceedings." However, nonadversary proceedings are excluded. 32 Fees
25. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 14, at 10-11, 14, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 4988-89, 4993.
26. Report of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Appendix 2, Proposed Amend-
ments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery, Advisory Committee's Ex-
planatory Statement Concerning Amendments of the Discovery Rules, 48 F.R.D. 487, 540
(1970).
27. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 14, at 18, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4997.
28. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (1982).
29. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 14, at 11, 1980 U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4989-
90.
30. An affirmative decision was made to include civil actions under the Social Security Act in
the Equal Access to Justice Act. See id. at 12, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4991.
31. 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1982).
32. Watkins v. Harris, 566 F. Supp. 493, 497 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Wolverton v. Schweiker, 533
F. Supp. 420, 423 (D. Idaho 1982), rev'd in part sub nom. Wolverton v. Heckler, 726 F.2d 580
360 [Vol. 7:355
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can only be paid when the government is a party to the agency pro-
ceedings, and takes an adversary stance. If the government position
before the Agency is substantially justified, or special circumstances
make the award unjust, fees are not awardable.33
III. ADJUDICATING SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIMS
A. The Administrative Process
Only after a lengthy administrative process may a claimant for
social security benefits 4 appeal his claim to the federal courts. He initi-
ates his claim for social security disability or retirement benefits, or for
supplemental security income,3 5 by filing a written application with the
Social Security Administration.36 The Agency then gathers information
from questionnaires completed by the claimant and from documents,
including medical records, submitted to the Agency by the claimant or
obtained by the Agency in its development of the claim. From this in-
formation, an agency worker grants or denies the claim. If the claim is
denied, or if existing benefits are terminated, the claimant may request
reconsideration of his claim. Reconsideration consists of a reexamina-
tion of the information obtained by the Agency. The file is reevaluated
by a worker who did not participate in the original decision to deny the
claim or to terminate benefits.37 As is the case with the original agency
decision, the decision maker is unlikely to have had a face-to-face inter-
view with the claimant.
The critical stage in the administrative appeal process is the hear-
ing before an administrative law judge. The hearing may be requested
within sixty days of denial of a claim upon reconsideration. 8 The
claimant has the right to appear in person before the administrative
law judge. He may be represented by counsel. He may call witnesses in
(9th Cir. 1984). See Guthrie v. Schweiker, 718 F.2d 104, 107 (4th Cir. 1983); H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 1434, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5003, 5012.
33. 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (1982).
34. Social security benefits are payable to retired and disabled workers. See 42 U.S.C. §§
401-433 (1982); 20 C.F.R. part 404 (1984).
35. Supplemental Security Income (SSI) provides payments to elderly and disabled individu-
als not covered by the Social Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383(c) (1982); 20 C.F.R. part
416 (1984). The claim and appeal procedures for SSI are virtually identical to those for social
security. References in this article will be made, unless otherwise noted, only to statutes and regu-
lations pertaining to social security. Generally, parallel provisions apply to SSI claimants.
36. 20 C.F.R. § 404.603 (1984).
37. Id. §§ 404.907-.909.
38. Id. §§ 404.929-.933.
1984]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
his own behalf. If it appears necessary, the administrative law judge
may be asked to subpoena records and witnesses.39
The hearing before the administrative law judge is nonadver-
sarial."° It is the duty of the judge to see that the record is developed
fully and fairly. "1 He may question witnesses and direct that additional
evidence be procured.42 Generally, the documents used by the Agency
at the initial decision and reconsideration stages are made part of the
hearing record. The administrative law judge may direct that voca-
tional experts or medical advisors appear at the hearing to testify con-
cerning the claim.4 3
From the record at the hearing, the administrative law judge ren-
ders a decision on the claim. The decision must be supported by find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law derived from the record.4 If benefits
are denied by the administrative law judge, a dissatisfied claimant may
perfect his final administrative appeal to the Appeals Council of the
Social Security Administration.' 5 Further documentary evidence may
be submitted to the Appeals Council. Generally, however, there is no
opportunity for the claimant to appear personally before the Appeals
Council. 6 The Appeals Council is not bound by the findings of fact of
the administrative law judge.47
B. Appeal to the Courts
The decision of the Appeals Council is the final administrative ad-
judication of the Social Security Administration on a claim for benefits.
A claimant may appeal from the decision of the Appeals Council by
filing an action for review in federal district court. The complaint must
be filed within 60 days of the decision of the Appeals Council. With its
answer, the Social Security Administration submits a copy of the ad-
39. Id. § 404.950.
40. Id. §§ 404.0944-.961. It has been held, however, that, at the administrative stage, the
Agency carries the burden to prove certain points. See, e.g., Jackson v. Schweiker, 696 F.2d 630,
631 n.l (8th Cir. 1983) (if claimant demonstrates inability to perform previous work, burden
shifts to Agency). It is unclear how the Agency can carry a burden of proof in a nonadversarial
hearing. Cf. Heaney, supra note 4, at 11.
41. Coulter v. Weinberger, 527 F.2d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 1975); Dunbar v. Califano, 454 F.
Supp. 1261, 1268 (W.D.N.Y. 1978).
42. 20 C.F.R. § 404.944 (1984).
43. Id. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(e) (vocational experts); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526(b) (medical
advisors).
44. 20 C.F.R. § 404.953(a).
45. Id. § 404.967.
46. See id. § 404.976.
47. Id. § 404.979. See Combs v. Weinberger, 501 F.2d 1361, 1363 (4th Cir. 1974).
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ministrative record on the claim, including a transcript of the hearing
before the administrative law judge.48
The appeal is not de novo; it is a review of the agency record.49
Because no new evidence may be considered by the court, district
courts generally dispose of these appeals following cross-motions for
summary judgment submitted by the claimant and by the Agency.50 If
the court finds that further evidence is necessary for resolution of the
claim, it may remand to the Agency for further proceedings.5 Other-
wise, it must affirm the decision of the Social Security Administration
unless it finds that the Agency erroneously applied a legal standard, or
that the decision of the Agency was not supported by substantial
evidence. 52
IV. APPLYING THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT TO
SOCIAL SECURITY APPEALS
Upon judicial reversal of an administrative denial of social security
benefits, a claimant may seek to recover attorney's fees. But a court
considering this claim is faced by a paradox. The same paradox is
presented any court awarding fees under the Equal Access to Justice
Act to a plaintiff who, on appeal from an administrative determination,
has prevailed because the agency decision was not supported by sub-
stantial evidence.
To prevail under the substantial evidence standard, the Agency
need not show that its decision was supported by the weight of the
evidence presented to the Agency. It must merely show that some evi-
dence of legal significance supported its decision, and that this modi-
48. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982). See id. § 1383(c)(3) (1982) (appeals from SSI
determinations).
49. Klug v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 423, 425 (8th Cir. 1975); Ainsworth v. Finch, 437 F.2d
446 (9th Cir. 1971).
50. Affidavits or other matters outside the pleadings may be considered through summary
judgment proceedings. FED. R. Civ. P. 56. Because the district court must limit its review to the
Agency record under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982), it has been suggested that a motion for affirm-
ance, see Garcia v. Califano, 463 F. Supp. 1098, 1100-01 (N.D. I11. 1979), or for judgment on the
pleadings, see Pirone v. Flemming, 183 F. Supp. 739, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), affd mem., 278 F.2d
508 (2d Cir. 1960), would be the better tool for review under the Social Security Act. As long as
review is restricted to the record, however, a motion for summary judgment may be used to re-
solve a social security appeal. Lovett v. Schweiker, 667 F.2d 1, 2-3 (5th Cir. 1981).
51. See, e.g., Landess v. Weinberger, 490 F.2d 1187 (8th Cir. 1974).
52. Bormey v. Schweiker, 695 F.2d 164, 167-68 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3091
(1983); Myers v. Califano, 611 F.2d 980, 982 (4th Cir. 1980); Conley v. Ribicoff, 294 F.2d 190,
194 (9th Cir. 1961).
1984]
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cum of evidence was evaluated under proper legal standards. 5 If the
Agency is unable to identify this minimal supporting evidence on ap-
peal to the satisfaction of the reviewing court, it seems unreasonable to
assert that the Agency was substantially justified in its position, either
at the administrative level or on judicial review.54 But if this is true, an
award of attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act would
flow virtually as a matter of right from a reversal of an administrative
determination, such as that of the Social Security Administration, un-
supported by substantial evidence. Clearly, however, such a routine
award of fees was not the intent of Congress.5"
Before a court reviewing a fee application arising from a social
security appeal can reach this issue, it must resolve several preliminary
matters. It has been suggested that the Equal Access to Justice Act
does not apply to litigation in the federal courts under the Social Se-
curity Act. 56 The retroactivity of the Act has been questioned.5" If the
Act does apply, it must be determined if the petitioner for fees pre-
vailed, particularly if the judicial remedy was remand, rather than re-
versal. Further, the claimant must show that a fee was incurred. Fi-
nally, the court must resolve whether the "position" that the
government must justify is the position advocated in the final adminis-
trative determination, or is the stance taken on review by the agency
litigators.
A. Are Social Security Appeals Within the Scope of the Equal Ac-
cess to Justice Act?
1. Administrative Proceedings
No fee can be awarded under the Equal Access to Justice Act for
time spent pursuing the administrative appeal at the agency level.
53. The quantum of evidence needed to comprise substafitial evidence in the appeal of a
denial of social security benefits has been variously described. It has been said to be "such rele-
vant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richard-
son v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). It is more than a scintilla of evidence. Timmerman v.
Weinberger, 510 F.2d 439, 441 (8th Cir. 1975). It is the quantum of evidence that would be
sufficient to justify the refusal to direct a verdict if the case were tried to a jury. Proctor v.
Schweiker, 526 F. Supp. 70, 73 (D. Md. 1981). It cannot be facts taken in isolation; it must be
based on the record as a whole. Thomas v. Celebrezze, 331 F.2d 541, 543 (4th Cir. 1964).
54. Cf. Operating Eng'rs Local Union No. 3 v. Bohn, 541 F. Supp. 486, 495 (D. Utah 1982)
("It is difficult for this court to perceive how action unsupported by 'substantial' evidence could be
'substantially' justified.").
55. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., Ocasio v. Schweiker, 540 F. Supp. 1320, 1321 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (finding the
Act applicable to social security appeals).
57. See Berman v. Schweiker, 713 F.2d 1290, 1303 (7th Cir. 1983) (Coffey, J., dissenting).
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Awards for proceedings under the Act are limited to adversary adjudi-
cations in which the government is represented.5 8 Administrative hear-
ings before the Social Security Administration on benefit claims are
nonadversarial in nature,59 and no fee can be awarded under the Act.60
Even when the agency proceedings are the result of a court order of
remand, no fee may be awarded for time spent by the claimant's attor-
ney at the administrative hearing ordered by the court.6
If the Agency takes a position in an adjudication, however, a fee
award is justified.62 Currently, the Social Security Administration is
engaging in an adversary experiment in a few locales.6 3 As part of the
experiment, the Agency may be represented at hearings and develop
the case against the claimant for a denial of fees. Although language in
the House report indicates an intent specifically to exclude all adminis-
trative proceedings before the Social Security Administration,64 hear-
ings conducted pursuant to the adversary experiment should be suscep-
tible to a fee award. 65
2. Judicial Proceedings
It is clear from the legislative history of the Equal Access to Jus-
tice Act that, although Congress intended to deny fee awards to pre-
vailing parties in administrative hearings before the Social Security
Administration, fee awards were to be made if claims were successfully
appealed to the federal courts. The bill originally passed in the Senate
had been broadly written, and would have permitted fees for adminis-
trative proceedings, as well as civil actions, under the Social Security
Act. The proposed House bill, however, excluded administrative pro-
ceedings, but continued to provide for fees in court actions under the
58. 5 U.S.C. §§ 504(a)(1), 504(b)(1)(c) (1982).
59. Wolverton v. Schweiker, 533 F. Supp. 420, 423-24 (D. Idaho 1982), rev'd in part sub
nom. Wolverton v. Heckler, 726 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1984). See supra note 40.
60. Guthrie v. Schweiker, 718 F.2d 104, 107 (4th Cir. 1983); Phillips v. Heckler, 574 F.
Supp. 870, 872 (W.D.N.C. 1983); Jones v. Schweiker, 565 F. Supp. 52, 54 (W.D.Mich. 1983);
Wolverton v. Schweiker, 533 F. Supp. 420, 423-24 (D. Idaho 1982), rev'd in part sub nom. Wol-
verton v. Heckler, 726 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1984).
61. Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978, 988 (8th Cir. 1984); Watkins v. Harris, 566 F.
Supp. 493, 497-98 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
62. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1434, supra note 32, at 23, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 5012.
63. 20 C.F.R. § 404.965 (1983).
64. See H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 14, at 12, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
4991.
65. See Vargyas, The Equal Access to Justice Act: Update and Analysis, 16 CLEARING-
HOUSE REV. 1110 (1983).
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Social Security Act. Whether civil actions under the Social Security
Act should be covered, the House report reveals, had been a subject of
much discussion within the House Committee on the Judiciary. The
Committee decided in favor of coverage, and no exclusion for social
security cases was included in the statute as adopted. 6
Despite this unambivalent legislative history, the Social Security
Administration repeatedly has argued that the Equal Access to Justice
Act does not provide coverage in social security appeals. Although this
position has been adopted in a number of unreported district court de-
cisions, 67 the reported decisions unanimously have held that attorney's
fees may be awarded to successful litigants in civil actions against the
Social Security Administration.68
The argument advanced by the Social Security Administration
against coverage under the Equal Access to Justice Act is that an ex-
clusive right to fees is contained in the Social Security Act. Under sec-
tion 406 of the Social Security Act, the attorney of a successful litigant
may be paid fees out of past due benefits withheld from the claimant
by the Agency. The fee award cannot exceed twenty-five percent of the
past due benefits. Counsel may exact no other fee from the claimant.6 9
The Equal Access to Justice Act permits an award of fees to a prevail-
ing party "[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided by statute. '70
This exclusion, the Agency argues, limits an attorney's fee recovery to
that authorized under the Social Security Act.
66. See H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 14, at 12, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
4991. That Congress intended to award fees for successful civil litigation on behalf of social secur-
ity claimants is further demonstrated by comments on the House floor prior to passage. Respond-
ing to a suggestion that social security cases had not been excluded, Congressman Railsback
stated that the proposed bill would "limit recovery only to actions where they went into the Fed-
eral district court. In other words, it would not apply to the administrative proceedings." 126
CONG. REC. H10220 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1980). Extended debate concerning the impact of fees in
social security litigation in the federal courts followed. Id. at H10220-24.
67. See Guthrie v. Schweiker, 718 F.2d 104, 107 n.3 (4th Cir. 1983) (citing unreported
cases).
68. E.g., Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978, 987 (8th Cir. 1984); Wolverton v. Heckler,
726 F.2d 580, 582 (9th Cir. 1984); Berman v. Schweiker, 713 F.2d 1290, 1296 (7th Cir. 1983);
Guthrie v. Schweiker, 718 F.2d 104, 107 (4th Cir. 1983).
69. Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant . . . the court may
determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for . representation,
not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is
entitled by reason of such judgment . . . . In case of any such judgment, no other fee
may be payable . . . except as provided in this paragraph.
42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) (1976).
70. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(A) (1982) (fees for lack of substantial justification in agency
position). Fees are awardable against the government as at common law "[ulnless expressly pro-
hibited by statute." Id. § 2412(b).
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However, the drafters of the Equal Access to Justice Act sought to
preserve existing fee-shifting statutes such as the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act7 ' and the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act,72 by
which fee awards against the government were already authorized. 71
The drafters did not intend to limit fee recoveries from agencies. The
Social Security Act does not authorize recovery from the Agency;
rather, it authorizes recovery by the attorney from proceeds otherwise
rightfully payable to the claimant. 74 The limitation it imposes on any
other payment of fees is intended to limit the fee imposed by attorneys
on claimants. It does not proscribe the recovery of a fee from other
sources. 75 Because section 406 is not a fee-shifting statute - indeed,
because in some cases it may provide no award to the attorney for a
successful litigant76 - an attorney's fee properly may be awarded suc-
cessful claimants in civil actions under the Social Security Act.
B. Has the Claimant Prevailed?
1. Remand Orders
The appeal of an unsuccessful claim for social security benefits to
the federal courts may not immediately be terminated by a simple af-
firmance or reversal of the agency's decision. The appeals may be re-
manded to the Agency for further administrative proceedings. Whether
a party who obtains an order of remand can be considered a "prevail-
ing party" for purposes of the Equal Access to Justice Act has been a
matter of dispute. Some courts have granted fees following remand or-
ders.7 8 Other courts have doubted whether a remand order goes suffi-
71. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1982).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
73. See H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 14, at 9-10, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
4987-89.
74. Muenich v. United States, 410 F. Supp. 944, 947-48 (N.D. Ind. 1976).
75. Guthrie v. Schweiker, 718 F.2d 104, 107 (4th Cir. 1983); Hornal v. Schweiker, 551 F.
Supp. 612, 615 (M.D. Tenn. 1982); Ocasio v. Schweiker, 540 F. Supp. 1320, 1321-22 (S.D.N.Y.
1982); Wolverton v. Schweiker, 533 F. Supp. 420, 422-23 (D. Idaho 1982), rev'd in part sub nom.
Wolverton v. Heckler, 726 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1984).
76. See, e.g., Lonning v. Schweiker, 568 F. Supp. 1079, 1081 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (no provision
for payment of attorney's fees from withheld SSI benefits); Berman v. Schweiker, 531 F. Supp.
1149, 1152-53 (N.D. I11. 1982) (no withheld benefits from which to pay attorney's fees), aff'd, 713
F.2d 1290 (7th Cir. 1983).
77. E.g., Guthrie v. Schweiker, 718 F.2d 104, 107 (4th Cir. 1983); Ocasio v. Schweiker, 540
F. Supp. 1320, 1321-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
78. Ceglia v. Schweiker, 566 F. Supp. 118 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); Gross v. Schweiker, 563 F.
Supp. 260 (N.D. Ind. 1983); Vega v. Schweiker, 558 F. Supp. 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), awarding fees
from 549 F. Supp. 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Ocasio v. Schweiker, 540 F. Supp. 1320 (S.D.N.Y.
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ciently to the merits of a claim to justify a fee award under the Act."
As expressed in the House report to accompany the Equal Access
to Justice Act, the intent of the drafters of the Act was not to limit the
phrase "prevailing party" only to a victor after entry of a final judg-
ment following a full trial on the merits. The House committee wished
to adopt the interpretation of a prevailing party developed under ex-
isting fee-shifting statutes. Thus, a fee was to be granted if a party
"prevailed on an interim order which was central to the case," or suc-
cessfully pursued an interlocutory appeal "sufficiently significant and
discrete to be treated as a separate unit."80
Courts that have awarded fees following entry of remand orders
have focused on this language in the House report. In Ceglia v.
Schweiker,81 for example, the House report was cited as support for an
award of fees. The court had remanded a claim, directing the Agency
to re-evaluate the evidence in accordance with proper legal standards.
The remand order, the court held, was sufficiently central to the claim-
ant's case to justify a fee award. The claimant's legal theory had been
adopted, and significant relief granted."2 In Gross v. Schweiker,85 the
court held that a failure of the administrative law judge to perform his
duty necessitated remand. Because the claimant had obtained the relief
requested from the court, to the extent that the court had authority to
enter relief, fees were awarded.8'
But the central issue in any appeal from a claim for social security
benefits is whether the claimant is eligible for benefits. For this reason,
it more appropriately has been held that fees cannot be awarded based
solely on an order of remand. Particularly if the case is remanded for
the purpose of obtaining additional evidence that was not presented at
the administrative hearing, it is reasonable to conclude that a party has
not prevailed when he has done no more than "move . . . one step
1982). Cf Wolverton v. Heckler, 726 F.2d 580, 583 (9th Cir. 1984) (fees awarded for work in
obtaining an initial order of remand, but not awarded for work in connection with second appeal
that led to outright reversal).
79. Roman v. Schweiker, 559 F. Supp. 304 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); Miller v. Schweiker, 560 F.
Supp. 838 (M.D. Ala. 1983). Cf Chastang v. Heckler, 729 F.2d 701, 702 (1lth Cir. 1983)
(claimant not entitled to fees as a prevailing party when appellate court upholds dismissal of
appeal by Social Security Administration from a district court order of remand).
80. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 14, at 11, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4990.
81. 566 F. Supp. 118 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
82. Id. at 121-22.
83. 563 F. Supp. 260 (N.D. Ind. 1983).
84. Id. at 261-62. See also Knox v. Schweiker, 567 F. Supp. 959 (D. Del. 1983) (cost alone
awarded on remand; no petition for fees filed).
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closer to a final determination." 85 However, if the remand is the result
of a misapplication of legal standards, or of the failure of the Agency
to meet minimum standards of fairness in conducting the initial hear-
ing, the remand issue goes sufficiently to the core issue of eligibility to
justify an attorney's fee. 86 The underlying claim for benefits, however,
ultimately should be shown to be meritorious. 87
To provide relief for meritorious claimants who obtain remand or-
ders, some courts have indicated that fees ultimately can be awarded if
the claim is favorably decided at the administrative hearing conducted
pursuant to a remand order. 88 If requested prior to the remand hearing,
the fee petition is denied. In this manner, the determination of whether
the claimant has prevailed is postponed until a final resolution of the
claim for benefits. This presents an attractive approach for the disposi-
tion of fee claims in connection with remands. However, as the court
noted in McGill v. Secretary of Health and Human Services," if the
claimant prevails on the hearing pursuant to the remand order, there
will be no further judicial proceedings. It is improbable that the deci-
sion on the post-remand hearing will occur within the 30-day period
following final judgment in the court action that is the statutory limita-
tion for the filing of a fee petition.9 If the claimant cannot file a timely
petition for attorney's fees following a successful post-remand hearing,
he will be left without a means to apply for the fees to which McGill
and similar decisions deem him entitled.
The solution to this dilemma was provided by the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit in Guthrie v. Schweiker.91 Neither the re-
mand order nor the Appeals Council decision on remand, the court
85. McGill v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 712 F.2d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1420 (1984). However, in Fast v. School Dist., 728 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 1984),
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ordered fees to be awarded when a terminated school
teacher won a nominal damage award and the right to a due process hearing in a civil rights
action filed in a federal district court. If the right to a hearing was sufficient in Fast to justify a
fee, arguably a fee should be awarded where a new hearing is obtained on remand in a social
security appeal.
86. Vega v. Schweiker, 558 F. Supp. 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
87. See Ceglia v. Schweiker, 566 F. Supp. 118, 122 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). But see Vega v.
Schweiker, 558 F. Supp. 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) and Gross v. Schweiker, 563 F. Supp. 260 (N.D.
Ind. 1983), in which no finding of the ultimate merits of the claim were made.
88. McGill v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 712 F.2d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1420 (1984); Guthrie v. Schweiker, 718 F.2d 104, 106 (4th Cir. 1983). A
similar approach has been taken for claims under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(1976). See Conner v.
Gardner, 381 F.2d 497 (4th Cir. 1967).
89. 712 F.2d 28, 29-30 (2d Cir. 1983).
90. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(B) (1982).
91. 718 F.2d 104 (4th Cir. 1983).
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held, is a final judgment. The claimant in Guthrie, following a success-
ful post-remand hearing, had moved for a fee award in the district
court that had granted the remand order. This, the court ruled, was
premature. 92 The Social Security Act contemplates the filing of a final
order in the federal court once the Agency has conducted a hearing on
remand."' It is the docketing of this final order, the court ruled, that
begins the 30-day period within which a fee petition may be filed.9 '
Once the final post-remand order as described in Guthrie is filed,
claimants may become "prevailing parties."9 5 On a fee application by
the claimant, the court should determine whether there was substantial
justification for the agency's opposition to the motion for remand, em-
ploying the same standards applicable to reversals of agency decisions.
Merely because a claimant obtains an order of remand and prevails on
the post-remand hearing, he should not be deemed entitled to attor-
ney's fees. But if the Agency fails to offer substantial justification for
its opposition to the motion to remand, attorney's fees should be paid
for the time spent by the attorney pursuing the matter in the courts.96
2. Partial Successes
Outcomes other than remand may bring into question whether a
claimant has prevailed. If, for example, a claimant asserts several theo-
ries for reversal, but only one is adopted, can he be said to have pre-
vailed sufficiently to be entitled to a full award of fees? This question
does not appear to have been raised in the context of attorney's fees
92. Id. at 106.
93. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982), the Secretary is to file modified or affirmed
findings with the court following an order of remand. The court should then issue a final order.
Guthrie v. Schweiker, 718 F.2d 104, 106 (4th Cir. 1983).
94. Guthrie v. Schweiker, 718 F.2d 104, 106 (4th Cir. 1983). Cf. McDonald v. Heckler, 726
F.2d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 1983) (petition timely if filed within 30 days of expiration of time to
appeal or of terminating order of court of last resort). The interpretation in Guthrie, it should be
noted, means that any action remanded prior to the effective date of the Equal Access to Justice
Act on which no final judgment has been entered by the court may be subject to a petition for
fees. If the Agency frequently fails to report the modified findings to the remanding court, as it
apparently failed to do in Guthrie, the Secretary may face a substantial exposure to fees from
adjudications predating the adoption of the Act.
95. On entry of a final judgment on appeal, the Social Security Act provides for a remand to
the Agency for the purpose of calculating benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(i) (1982). A remand for this
purpose follows final judgment, Ellis v. Heckler, 569 F. Supp. 792 (E.D. Pa. 1983), and should
cause no postponement of the decision on a fee petition arising out of the judgment. The petition
should be filed immediately following the final judgment, without awaiting the calculation of bene-
fits by the Agency.
96. Berman v. Schweiker, 713 F.2d 1290, 1298 n.21 (7th Cir. 1983); San Filippo V. Secre-
tary of Health and Human Services, 564 F. Supp. 173, 175 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
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claims under the Equal Access to Justice Act arising from social secur-
ity appeals.
To the extent alternate theories are advanced in bad faith or ap-
pear patently frivolous, the Act contemplates a fee adjustment. The
court may reduce the amount to be awarded, or deny an award if the
prevailing party engaged in conduct that unreasonably protracted the
resolution of the controversy. 97 The fee is to be reasonable, calculated
with regard to the market rate. 8 If, however, the championing of alter-
nate theories was not unreasonable or did not protract the litigation,
there is no basis for a reduction in the fee award. 99
A more difficult case is presented by a claimant who receives only
a portion of the benefits sought. The legislative history suggests that a
litigant who is only partially successful is entitled to a full fee award. 100
Decisions arising out of litigation under existing fee statutes served as a
model for the view of the House committee report on this point. 10'
However, recent interpretations of these statutes bring into question
this sweeping interpretation of the Act.
In Hensley v. Eckerhart,02 the Supreme Court held that a district
court, in granting fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards
Act, had failed to consider the relationship between the extent of suc-
cess and the amount of the attorney's fee award.' In light of Hensley,
a court considering an attorney's fee petition arising from a social se-
curity claim should give some weight to the scope of relief obtained.' 0 '
Generally, the primary issue in a social security claim will be
whether the claimant was disabled. If the claimant is found eligible for
benefits, benefits will be payable for an indeterminate time, until the
claimant is no longer disabled. However, there may also be a dispute
concerning the onset date of the disability and the amount of back ben-
efits to be paid. If a claimant successfully appeals a disability determi-
nation, and therefore initiates an indeterminate period of eligibility for
benefits, full fees should be awarded even if the claimant is not deter-
97. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(C) (1982).
98. Id. § 2412(d)(2)(A).
99. Cf. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1940 (1983).
100. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 14, at 11, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at
4990.
101. E.g., Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
102. 103 S. Ct. 1933 (1983).
103. Id. at 1943.
104. Cf. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 703 F.2d 700, 717 (3d Cir. 1983)
(Thompson, J., concurring) (award onily for fees incurred in challenging unreasonable Agency
position).
1984]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
mined to have had as early an onset date as alleged. The importance of
the assurance of regular income for an indefinite period of time greatly
outweighs the small loss of some finite amount of back benefits, so that
the extent of success on appeal far outweighs what is lost. Through the
disability determination, the claimant achieves essentially complete re-
lief.10 5 On the other hand, if the claim is for a closed period of disabil-
ity, and reversal on appeal only pertains to a portion of the period, a
reduced fee award may be in order.
If, however, the test is whether the expenditure of counsel's time
was reasonable in relation to the success achieved, as suggested in
Hensley,'0 the court should consider whether significant additional
time was expended in litigating the unsuccessful portion of the claim on
appeal. Since social security appeals are usually litigated by cross-mo-
tions for summary judgment on briefs submitted to the court, it is diffi-
cult to extricate hours spent on unsuccessful claims from all hours
spent on the litigation. Usually, the hours expended in litigation would
not be reduced significantly had counsel not pursued the entire period
of disability appealed. Counsel would still be required to study and ad-
dress the entire record of the administrative hearing. For that reason,
courts should be reluctant to reduce fees simply because complete relief
is not achieved.10 7
C. Retroactive and Prospective Coverage
There has been extensive debate concerning the retroactivity of the
Equal Access to Justice Act. In Berman v. Schweiker,108 Judge Coffey,
dissenting from the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, argued that the Act was not retroactive. There was, he
105. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1940 (1983).
106. Id. at 1941.
107. In general, the practice is to award to outright prevailing parties the actual hours spent
times an hourly rate (usually at the maximum rate of $75). See, e.g., Lonning v. Schweiker, 568
F. Supp. 1079, 1085 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Vega v. Schweiker, 558 F. Supp. 52, 54 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
If the court finds that counsel expended more time than would be required to handle the matter
competently, fees may be reduced from the amount requested. See Kauffman v. Schweiker, 559 F.
Supp. 372, 376-77 (M.D. Pa. 1983). Some courts have considered adjusting fees in light of factors
such as those articulated in-Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th
Cir. 1974). See Phillips v. Heckler, 574 F. Supp. 870, 873 (W.D.N.C. 1983); Moholland v.
Schweiker, 546 F. Supp. 383, 387 (D.N.H. 1982). The $75 per hour rate may be adjusted for cost
of living increases. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 703 F.2d 700, 713 (3d Cir.
1983). A fee award may properly exceed the amount recovered by the claimant. See H.R. REP.
No. 1418, supra note 14, at 9-10, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4988 (Act created to
provide remedy when cost of contesting a government order exceeds the amount at stake).
108. 713 F.2d 1290 (7th Cir. 1983).
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noted, no "clear, strong and imperative" language authorizing a recov-
ery of fees for time expended on litigation prior to the effective date of
the Act. Further, the Act contained no clear waiver of sovereign immu-
nity. Finally, an award of fees for time spent on the litigation was not
consistent with the purposes of the Act. Since the attorney representing
the claimant had filed the appeal prior to the effective date of the Act,
he bore an ethical obligation to carry through in representation. The
beneficent purpose of the Act, to assure representation for claimants
otherwise unable to afford the expense of counsel, would thus be ful-
filled without a fee award, Judge Coffey noted. 109
The weight of authority, however, holds that counsel is entitled to
an award of fees compensating all his efforts in the appeal since its
filing in district court. 110 This generally has been held to include ser-
vices rendered prior to the enactment date of the Act, if the case was
then pending. 1 In reaching this result, courts have noted that the
plain meaning of the statute favors retroactivity, and that retroactivity
fits the broad remedial purposes of the Act. 2 The statutory language
has been deemed sufficiently explicit to constitute an express waiver of
sovereign immunity." 3 Indeed, the Act has been construed to permit
fees when the appeal time had not run by the effective date of the Act,
even though virtually all the hours to be claimed by counsel must have
been incurred prior to enactment." 4 Given the generally accepted in-
terpretation of similar fee statutes on this point,"15 this broad construc-
tion of the retroactivity of the Act is warranted." 6
By its terms, the Act will continue to be applicable to actions filed
109. Id. at 1303-07 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
110. See, e.g., Berman v. Schweiker, 713 F.2d 1290 (7th Cir. 1983); United States ex rel.
Heydt v. Citizens State Bank, 668 F.2d 444, 446 (8th Cir. 1982); Wolverton v. Schweiker, 533 F.
Supp. 420, 423-24 (D. Idaho 1982), rev'd in part sub nom. Wolverton v. Heckler, 726 F.2d 580
(9th Cir. 1984).
111. See, e.g., Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978, 988 (8th Cir. 1984); Rawlings v. Heck-
ler, 725 F.2d 1192, 1194 (9th Cir. 1984); Berman v. Schweiker, 713 F.2d 1290, 1299 (7th Cir.
1983); Jones v. Schweiker, 565 F. Supp. 52, 54 (W.D. Mich. 1983); Moholland v. Schweiker, 546
F. Supp. 383, 385 (D.N.H. 1982).
112. Berman v. Schweiker, 713 F.2d 1290, 1297-99 (7th Cir. 1983); Watkins v. Harris, 566
F. Supp. 493 (E.D.Pa. 1983).
113. Berman v. Schweiker, 713 F.2d 1290, 1300-01 (7th Cir. 1983); Wolverton v. Schweiker,
533 F. Supp. 420, 423 (D. Idaho 1982), rev'd in part sub nom. Wolverton v. Heckler, 726 F.2d
580 (9th Cir. 1984).
114. E.g., Berman v. Schweiker, 531 F. Supp. 1149 (N.D. Ill. 1982), affd, 713 F.2d 1290
(7th Cir. 1983).
115. See, e.g., Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 710-16 (1974); Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553
F.2d 1360, 1366-67 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
116. But see Miller, Retroactivity of Fee Awards Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 29
Loy. L. REv. 21 (1983).
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in the courts before the "sunset" date of October 1, 1984. The plain
language of the statute, which provides that "the provisions of [28
U.S.C. § 2412(d)] shall continue to apply through final disposition of
any action commenced before the date of repeal,"11 obviates any argu-
ment that counsel will not be entitled to compensation for time ex-
pended after the "sunset" date on such litigation. If a fee petition on an
order of remand may not be made until entry of a final judgment after
termination of the administrative proceedings pursuant to the re-
mand, 1 ' fee petitions will be appropriate for matters before the
Agency pursuant to a remand under and not actively in litigation on
the "sunset" date.
D. When is a Fee Incurred?
Yet another issue preliminary to a determination of substantial
justification for a fee award under the Equal Access to Justice Act is
whether a fee has been "incurred" by the prevailing party. The fee that
an attorney may collect from a client in a social security appeal is
closely regulated. It must be approved by the court. Up to 25 percent
of the past-due benefits withheld by the Agency, but awarded to the
claimant pursuant to a successful civil action, may be paid directly to
the claimant's counsel." 9 The court-approved award must be the only
payment an attorney receives from his client for his services on the
appeal.'
Although the Social Security Act does not preclude an award of
fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, the Social Security Admin-
istration has argued that no fee is "incurred" until the court has issued
a fee ruling under the Social Security Act and the payment is made to
the attorney from the back benefits.' 2' However, in the context of the
Equal Access to Justice Act, a fee is "incurred" when the claimant
becomes liable for it, not when it is actually paid.'22 This interpretation
is supported by the legislative history'23 and by the Act itself, which
provides for recovery of fees at a reasonable market rate, rather than at
117. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 note (1982).
118. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) (1976).
120. Id. § 406(b)(2).
121. See Wolverton v. Schweiker, 533 F. Supp. 420, 423 (D. Idaho 1982), rev'd in part sub
nom. Wolverton v. Heckler, 726 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1984).
122. 553 F. Supp. at 423.
123. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 14, at 15, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at
4994 (computation of fees should be without reference to fee arrangement between attorney and
client).
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the billing rate. 124 Thus, even if an attorney agrees to represent a
claimant for an hourly fee significantly less than the market rate, the
court, in awarding compensation for fees "incurred," may base the
amount of fees awarded at the prevailing market rate. 12 5
The Agency also has suggested that a fee is not "incurred" if the
agreement for representation provides that the counsel will receive no
compensation from the client for his services. This most often arises in
representation by attorneys employed by organizations funded by the
Legal Services Corporation. It may also occur if a private attorney rep-
resents a claimant pro bono.
An early unreported decision, Kinne v. Schweiker,12' held that a
law school clinic was not entitled to fees because it had not charged its
client for its services, and, thus, no fees had been incurred. Although
the court ultimately vacated and reversed this order,127 the initial fee
denial provided the precedent upon which at least one reported decision
rested a denial of fees to a claimant represented by uncompensated
counsel. In this decision, Cornelia v. Schweiker,128 the district court set
out four reasons for denying fees. Each of these justifications, however,
subsequently has been rejected by other courts considering a fee award
to uncompensated counsel. Indeed, the district court in Cornelia was
reversed on review.
First, Cornelia suggests that the plain meaning of "incurred," a
term undefined in the Act, must be employed. Fees are incurred only if
the plaintiff is liable for them. No fee was charged the claimant in
Cornelia for legal services representation; therefore, he had incurred no
fee.' 29 Although this is a fair reading of the plain meaning of "in-
curred,"130 the word must be read in context.' 31 Because fees are to be
determined with regard to the market rate, rather than being strictly
limited to the amount agreed between the attorney and the claimant,
every reported decision except Cornelia has held that the term "in-
curred" does not limit the recovery of fees to claimants represented by
124. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (1982). See Ward v. Schweiker, 562 F. Supp. 1173, 1175
(W.D. Mo. 1983).
125. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 14, at 15, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at
4994.
126. No. 80-81 (D. Vt. June 30, 1982, vacated, Dec. 29, 1982).
127. Kinne v. Schweiker, No. 80-81 (D. Vt. Dec. 29, 1982).
128. 553 F. Supp. 240 (D.S.D. 1982), rev'd, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1984). The fee denial
due to pro bono representation is an alternate holding. The court found the government position to
be substantially justified. 553 F. Supp. at 245.
129. Id. at 245.
130. See Chee v. Schweiker, 563 F. Supp. 1362, 1364 (D. Ariz. 1983).
131. See, e.g., Jones v. Schweiker, 565 F. Supp. 52, 55 (W.D. Mich. 1983).
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private counsel.13 2
Second, the court in Cornelia asserted that the purpose of the Act
was to vindicate the rights of claimants. A claimant represented by le-
gal services need pay no fee to pursue his appeal, and therefore faces
no economic deterrent to contesting government action. Indeed, the
court pointed out, the claimant in Cornelia had twice resorted to the
adjudicatory process. "[H]e was not made to endure any injustice,
rather he successfully contested it," the court noted.133
As many as three policy goals of the Equal Access to Justice Act
have been identified, however. One purpose is to reduce economic de-
terrents to opposing unreasonable governmental action,134 but the Act
also seeks to discourage the government from taking unjustified posi-
tions.135 Thus, it cautions an agency to carefully evaluate its case, and
not to pursue one that is weak and tenuous. 3 ' Finally, the Act seeks to
provide incentives to individuals to pursue the enforcement of their
rights.13 7
The Act, then, does not only concern itself with the cost to the
individual of litigation. Rather, it seeks to address unwarranted govern-
ment action. The potential for financial reward may encourage a pro
bono attorney to take action on behalf of a social security claimant. If
the potential for fees will encourage pro bono counsel to pursue civil
litigation against the government, agencies should be encouraged to
evaluate more carefully the stance they take against claimants repre-
sented by uncompensated counsel. Because claimants' counsel will
more readily take such matters to litigation, incentives will be provided
for the enforcement of abridged rights. 3 8
132. E.g., Ceglia v. Schweiker, 566 F. Supp. 118, 123 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); Chee v. Schweiker,
563 F. Supp. 1362, 1364 (D. Ariz. 1983); Ward v. Schweiker, 562 F. Supp. 1173, 1174-75 (W.D.
Mo. 1983); Hornal v. Schweiker, 551 F. Supp. 612, 616-17 (M.D. Tenn. 1982).
133. 553 F. Supp. at 246.
134. Id. at 247. See also McGill v. Secretary of HHS, 712 F.2d 28, 30 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1420 (1984); Lonning v. Schweiker, 568 F. Supp. 1079, 1980-81 (E.D. Pa.
1983); Phillips v. Heckler, 574 F. Supp. 870, 871 (W.D.N.C. 1983); H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra
note 14, at 12, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4991.
135. Berman v. Schweiker, 713 F.2d 1290, 1296 (7th Cir. 1983); Jones v. Schweiker, 565 F.
Supp. 52, 55 (W.D.Mich. 1983).
136. San Filippo v. Secretary of HHS, 564 F. Supp. 173, 174 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); McDonald
v. Schweiker, 551 F. Supp. 327, 333 (N.D. Ind. 1982), rev'd, 726 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1983). Cf.,
Ceglia v. Schweiker, 566 F. Supp. 118, 125 n.7 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (government should evaluate
more carefully when to litigate social security appeals).
137. Berman v. Schweiker, 713 F.2d 1290, 1296 (7th Cir. 1983); Hornal v. Schweiker, 551
F. Supp. 612, 614-15 (M.D. Tenn. 1982); H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 14, at 5-6, 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4984.
138. See Cornelia v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978, 986-87 (8th Cir. 1984); Jones v. Schweiker,
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Cornelia suggests that only a claimant who has hired a private
sector attorney is economically deterred from pursuing his rights under
the Social Security Act.189 However, significant economic considera-
tions are present when a legal services attorney decides to provide rep-
resentation to a social security claimant. 40 Arguably, public interest
law associations are more in need of remuneration than private attor-
neys. 141 A fee award for successful litigation can be used to increase
the limited manpower and financial resources of a legal aid office.'14 In
addition, the potential for fees may encourage the office to divert a
larger portion of its limited resources to challenging unwarranted gov-
ernment activity, thus permitting more claimants to seek redress in the
courts. In this manner, the rights of more claimants will be vindicated
if fees are awarded to pro bono and legal services counsel.
A third justification for denial of fees to pro bono attorneys cited
in Cornelia was derived from a review of other fee-shifting statutes.
Although other statutes had been interpreted to permit fee awards to
legal services attorneys and other uncompensated counsel, the court in
Cornelia asserted that these statutes did not require that fees be "in-
curred." In those other statutes, Cornelia suggests, the fee is an inte-
gral part of the remedy; in the Equal Access to Justice Act, the fee
serves a separate purpose in curbing unreasonable government
action. 14
This same purpose has been cited for other fee-shifting statutes,
however. The purpose is vindicated by permitting an award of fees to
pro bono counsel. 44 Nonetheless, the textual difference in the use of
"incurred" upon which Cornelia relies may be significant. One other
fee-shifting statute, the Freedom of Information Act, requires that fees
be "incurred" before an award of attorney's fees is permitted. 43 In
dicta, it has been suggested that pro bono counsel may receive fees
565 F. Supp. 52, 55 (W.D.Mich. 1983); Watkins v. Harris, 566 F. Supp. 493, 499 (E.D. Pa.
1983).
139. 553 F. Supp. at 246.
140. Jones v. Schweiker, 565 F. Supp. 52, 55 (W.D. Mich. 1983); San Filippo v. Secretary of
Health and Human Services, 564 F. Supp. 173, 176-77 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
141. Lonning v. Schweiker, 568 F. Supp. 1079, 1082 (E.D.Pa. 1983).
142. Watkins v. Harris, 566 F. Supp. 493, 499 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
143. 553 F. Supp. at 246-47.
144. See. e.g., Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1244-46 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 913 (1978) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act attorney's fee provision promotes en-
forcement of underlying rights; fee available to pro bono counsel).
145. "The court may assess against the United States reasonable attorney fees and other
litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case under this section in which the complainant has
substantially prevailed." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1982).
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under that act. 46 But the requirement that an attorney's fee be in-
curred has caused courts to deny pro se litigants attorney's fee
awards. 147 Courts that have granted pro se litigants fees under the
Freedom of Information Act have construed the act not to require that
fees be incurred. 14 8 In rejecting Cornella and granting attorney's fees
to social security litigants who were represented by legal services coun-
sel, courts have in part relied on the favorable dicta in cases interpret-
ing the Freedom of Information Act. 4 9 However, whether that act re-
quires that fees be incurred is determinative of fee awards to pro se
litigants. Squarely confronted with the issue, courts should find that the
same logic applies to fee awards for the work of pro bono counsel: if
"incurred" modifies "attorney's fees," no fee can be awarded pro bono
counsel. That same analysis, applied to the Equal Access to Justice
Act, would preclude fee awards to uncompensated counsel.
Finally, Cornella asserts that because financial eligibility require-
ments for a party requesting fees are set out in the Equal Access to
Justice Act, 50 a fee award should be denied if there is no economic
deterrent to pursuing litigation because of a party's wealth. Because
the claimant in Cornella was represented by a legal services attorney,
the court held he was not economically deterred and was not intended
to be covered by the Act. 5 '
This reading of the purpose of the statute as applied to claimants
represented by legal services counsel has been rejected.' The restric-
tions on eligibility of parties for a fee award, however, present other
potential difficulties for pro bono counsel. Generally, it has been agreed
that the "prevailing party" to whom a fee may be awarded is the
claimant, not his attorney. 53 The financial restrictions of the Equal
Access to Justice Act, applied to claimants, would bar few fee awards.
For individuals, only a net worth of more than $1,000,000 is disqualify-
ing.154 However, because the fee awarded pursuant to pro bono repre-
146. Cunningham v. FBI, 664 F.2d 383, 385 nn.1&2 (3d Cir. 1981); Crooker v. U.S. Dep't
of the Treasury, 634 F.2d 48, 49 n.1 (2d Cir. 1980).
147. See Cunningham v. FBI, 664 F.2d 383, 384-87 (3d Cir. 1981); Crooker v. United
States Dep't of Justice, 632 F.2d 916, 921 (1st Cir. 1980).
148. See, e.g., Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("incurred" does
not modify "reasonable attorney fees"; fees awarded to pro se litigant).
149. See, e.g., San Filippo v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 564 F. Supp. 173,
176 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); Hornal v. Schweiker, 551 F. Supp. 612, 616 (M.D. Tenn. 1982).
150. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (1982). See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
151. 553 F. Supp. at 248.
152. See supra notes 134-42 and accompanying text.
153. E.g., Kauffman v. Schweiker, 559 F. Supp. 372, 374 n.1 (M.D. Pa. 1983).
154. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(i) (1982).
[Vol. 7:355
ATTORNEY'S FEES
sentation is payable directly to the representative, it has been suggested
that the pro bono counsel or the organization of which he is a staff
member may petition in its own name for fees. 155 Indeed, a legal aid
organization has been treated as a "party" under the Act. 156 This
presents little difficulty for legal aid offices, which are generally quali-
fied as section 503(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations under the Internal
Revenue Code, and therefore are not disqualified from receiving fees
regardless of net worth.1 57 However, this interpretation could disqualify
members of large or well-to-do private firms representing a claimant,
whether pro bono or for an agreed fee.
These difficulties will be averted if the claimant is recognized as
the "party." Although the fee award may be directly payable to pro
bono counsel, s the petition should be brought in the name of the
claimant, and the qualification restrictions for parties should be applied
to claimants, not their counsel. Indigent claimants should not be dis-
suaded from seeking to have successful private counsel vindicate their
rights, if the counsel is willing to undertake such representation. For
the same reasons, despite its requirement that fees be incurred, the Act
should be interpreted to encourage legal services organizations to re-
present clients seeking to challenge unwarranted government activity.
E. What Position Must Be Justified?
Before determining whether the government position was substan-
tially justified,15 9 a court reviewing a petition for attorney's fees must
determine what "position" is to be examined. Three views have
emerged. Some courts have examined the agency determination giving
rise to the appeal.6 0 Other courts have indicated that "position" means
litigation position.'61 The third view has been to consider the position of
the Agency both before and during litigation.'1 2
The first view looks to the facts giving rise to the litigation. The
underlying position of the Agency, not its trial posture, is the relevant
issue. The Agency must justify the action that made it necessary for
155. Ceglia v. Schweiker, 566 F. Supp. 118, 120 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
156. Ocasio v. Schweiker, 540 F. Supp. 1320, 1323 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
157. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(ii) (1982).
158. Ceglia v. Schweiker, 566 F. Supp. 118, 120 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
159. A fee is to be awarded to a prevailing party "unless the court finds that the position of
the United States was substantially justified." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1982).
160. Lonning v. Schweiker, 568 F. Supp. 1079, 1082 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
161. Smith v. Schweiker, 563 F. Supp. 891, 892 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), afrd, 729 F.2d 1442 (2d
Cir. 1983).
162. E.g., Washington v. Heckler, 573 F. Supp. 1567, 1571 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
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the claimant to file suit. Under this view, the Equal Access to Justice
Act seeks to control the actions of administrative agencies, not those of
Justice Department litigators.1 63
The facts giving rise to the litigation, in the context of a social
security appeal, however, comprise the administrative record subject to
review. This record provides the basis for the government position.
Therefore, it has been suggested that a lack of substantial evidence in
the record to support the agency determination must mean that the
Agency lacked substantial justification for that determination."", This
interpretation of "position" leads to an automatic fee award in the ap-
peal of administrative decisions.16 5 This was not the intent of
Congress. 66
The second view examines the position of the Agency before the
court. Trial conduct becomes relevant.1 17 A preliminary decision to de-
fend the agency position may be justifiable, but the agency position
becomes unjustifiable if the government adopts an unreasonable posi-
tion at a later stage in the litigation. 6 8 If, however, the Agency capitu-
lates shortly after filing an answer, when it determines its position to be
without legal justification, it may be held to have acted reasonably.
Consideration of the litigation position offers a workable approach
to analysis in the context of social security appeals. At the time an
attorney for the Agency prepares an answer to a complaint appealing a
denial of benefits; he will not have the benefit of the agency record
before him. The record is required to be filed at the time of the
agency's answer 69; it may not be available before then. At the time the
answer is filed, the agency attorney may not have had the opportunity
to study the record to determine the strength of the agency position. If
the litigation position is the determinative factor in assessing a fee
163. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 703 F.2d 700, 707 (3d Cir. 1983).
See Rawlings v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1192, 1195-96 (9th Cir. 1984).
164. See Operating Eng'rs Local Union No. 3 v. Bohn, 541 F. Supp. 486, 495 (D. Utah
1982).
165. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 703 F.2d 700, 719 (3d Cir. 1983)
(Hunter, J., dissenting).
166. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
167. See McDonald v. Schweiker, 551 F. Supp. 327, 333 (N.D. Ind. 1982), rev'd, 726 F.2d
311 (7th Cir. 1983). Misconduct in the handling of a social security appeal, conducted entirely on
written motions and briefs, will often only make the work of the opposing party less difficult. See
McDonald v. Schweiker, 726 F.2d 311, 316 (7th Cir. 1984) (government failure to file timely
brief held not to be factor in setting fee).
168. Cf. Tyler Business Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 695 F.2d 73, 75-76 (4th Cir. 1982) (adminis-
trative proceedings).
169. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982).
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award, the Agency could avoid exposure to an award by examining the
record once it was prepared, analyzing the strength of its case, and
confessing error if error appears in the record. If this examination were
made without unreasonable delay, the Agency would advance a reason-
able litigation position at all times, even if there had been no justifica-
tion for the final agency determination on the claim.1""
If reasonable justification is determined by the litigation position
of the Agency, however, there is no deterrent for unreasonable agency
action. To implement this objective of the Act, some consideration
must be given to the underlying agency position. Otherwise, the
Agency can deny benefits to a claimant without justification, forcing
the claimant to seek judicial review. This puts the claimant to the ex-
pense of commencing appeal, as well as to the delays inherent in ap-
peal, without a penalty being assessed against the Agency. The Agency
merely has to confess error once the transcript is submitted, perhaps
several months after filing of the complaint.
To control agency conduct, a third definition of position has been
proposed. In Moholland v. Schweiker, 72 the court noted that the "sub-
stantial justification" language of the Act had -derived from rule
37(a)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This rule was enacted
to deter parties from forcing a discovery battle to court when there was
no genuine dispute. The court in Moholland therefore adopted a posi-
tion followed by several other courts, 173 that both the underlying posi-
tion of the Agency and trial conduct should be considered in evaluating
the position of the Agency pursuant to a fee application.7 4
This approach creates little deterrence for an agency, however. In
a normal case, there will be few hours of an attorney's time on which to
claim fees if the government confesses error shortly after filing an an-
swer. A complaint in a social security disability appeal can be a form
pleading, alleging a final administrative decision and the lack of sub-
stantial justification to support the decision. Little time is required for
170. Cf. Operating Eng'rs Local Union No. 3 v. Bohn, 541 F. Supp. 486, 495-96 (D. Utah
1982) (government substantially justified when it capitulated within 9 days of filing of complaint
against it). As has been noted, however, the position of the Social Security Administration has
been to litigate even weak claims. See Zimmerman v. Schweiker, 575 F. Supp. 1436, 1441
(E.D.N.Y. 1983); Ceglia v. Schweiker, 566 F. Supp. 118, 125 n.7 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
171. See Moholland v. Schweiker, 546 F. Supp. 383, 385-86 (D.N.H. 1982).
172. 546 F. Supp. 383 (D.N.H. 1982).
173. E.g., Washington v. Heckler, 573 F. Supp. 1567, 1571 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Watkins v.
Harris, 566 F. Supp. 493, 498 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Gross v. Schweiker, 563 F. Supp. 260, 262 (N.D.
Ind. 1983).
174. 546 F. Supp. at 385-86. See also Cornelia v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978, 983 (8th Cir.
1984).
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its preparation. Usually, the plaintiff's attorney cannot prepare and
brief a motion for summary judgment or pursue other remedies for the
claimant until after the record is submitted by the Agency. If the
Agency confesses judgment upon preparation of the record, the claim-
ant's counsel typically will have few billable hours to claim. A fee
award based on these hours is hardly an effective deterrent to unjusti-
fied agency action.
Furthermore, claims may not be made for an attorney's fees in-
curred in administrative proceedings.1"" A claimant is barred from
seeking fees if he wins at the agency level, even if the initial agency
position is unjustified. This being the case, it is illogical that hours
spent before the Agency opposing an unjustified position should provide
a basis for a fee award on appeal if the claimant loses at the agency
level. The claimant is only entitled to compensation for attorney's fees
incurred in the federal court proceedings; it is the behavior of the
Agency in court that should be examined. The Agency should be en-
couraged to recognize its error at the administrative stage, confess er-
ror, and cease unreasonable litigation. But because administrative pro-
ceedings before the Social Security Administration are excluded from
the Equal Access to Justice Act, the underlying agency determination
should not be considered the position to be justified under the Act.
In reality, the distinction between litigation position and agency
position underlying the litigation is of little moment. Ultimately, the
government litigator will have to determine whether he can offer a rea-
sonable defense for the agency determination of the claimant's ineligi-
bility for benefits. The litigator must decide if the record adduced
before the Agency supports the denial of benefits. Once he makes the
decision to proceed, he effectively adopts the agency position below as
the litigation position of the Agency176 Therefore, it is only as to a
claim for the hours expended in interviewing the claimant and prepar-
ing the complaint that the distinction is relevant. Because fees for
nonadversarial agency proceedings are not contemplated by the Equal
Access to Justice Act, however, "position" is most reasonably interpre-
tated as the litigation position of the Agency, once the decision to liti-
gate is made.
175. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
176. See Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978, 983 (8th Cir. 1984); Spencer v. NLRB, 712
F.2d 539, 551 & n.45, 553-54 & n.53 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1908 (1984).
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F. Substantial Justification
Since enactment of the Equal Access to Justice Act, federal dis-
trict courts and courts of appeals repeatedly have examined whether
the Social Security Administration was "substantially justified" in un-
successful efforts to defend its final administrative adjudication on ap-
peal to the federal courts. A few courts have indicated that a fee award
is allowed as a matter of course when summary judgment is granted.1"7
A variety of other standards have been proposed to award or deny at-
torney's fees to social security claimants who obtained reversal of ad-
verse administrative decisions on their claims for benefits.
One approach is to evaluate the evidence present in the record
tending to show that the claimant was not eligible for benefits. Courts
have held that a fee award is appropriate because the agency's decision
to deny benefits was supported by no evidence, 17 8 or by "absolutely no
evidence,"'" 9 or had been made "without considering the evidence.' 180
Using this approach, courts have denied fee awards because there was
"some evidence" supporting the Agency. 181 However, a litigant has re-
ceived fees under similar circumstances on a finding that there was "es-
sentially no evidence" to provide a foundation for denial of his social
security benefits. 82
Other decisions look to the reasonableness of the position of the
Social Security Administration. The position of the Agency on appeal
from a denial of social security benefits is deemed substantially justified
if the position of the Agency is "reasonable."' 83 Other courts have indi-
cated that the standard must be "slightly above one based on reasona-
bleness.' 81 4 It has been suggested that fees should be denied when the
stance of the Agency is "arguably defensible,"'' 85 even if the court has
ruled against the Agency on the underlying appeal from the denial of
benefits. When "reasonable minds could disagree"' 86 on the merits of
the claim, fees have been denied. The most intricate analysis has re-
177. E.g., McDonald v. Schweiker, 551 F. Supp. 327, 333 (N.D. Ind. 1982), rev'd, 726 F.2d
311 (7th Cir. 1983).
178. Moholland v. Schweiker, 546 F. Supp. 383, 386 (D.N.H. 1982).
179. Lonning v. Schweiker, 568 F. Supp. 1079, 1085 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
180. Phillips v. Heckler, 574 F. Supp. 870, 872 (W.D.N.C. 1983) (emphasis omitted).
181. Washington v. Heckler, 573 F. Supp. 1567, 1571 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
182. Hornal v. Schweiker, 551 F. Supp. 612, 617 (M.D. Tenn. 1982).
183. Jones v. Schweiker, 565 F. Supp. 52, 55 (W.D. Mich. 1983).
184. Wolverton v. Schweiker, 533 F. Supp. 420, 424 (D. Idaho 1982), rev'd in part sub nom.
Wolverton v. Heckler, 726 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1984).
185. Guthrie v. Schweiker, 718 F.2d 104, 108 (4th Cir. 1983).
186. Washington v. Heckler, 573 F. Supp. 1567, 1571 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
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quired a three-part examination of reasonableness of fact, law, and the
application of the facts to the law. 87
None of the standards suggested, however, address the paradox
posed by the application of the Equal Access to Justice Act to success-
ful appeals from administrative adjudications: How can substantial jus-
tification be found for a government position that, by definition, was
not supported by substantial evidence presented to the Agency? An ex-
amination of each of the existing standards demonstrates that they are
inadequate tools to determine the merits of fee claims in cases reviewed
in the federal courts under the Social Security Act. By considering the
justification for the legal theory underlying the agency position on ap-
peal, however, fee petitions can be properly analyzed.
1. Attorney's Fees as a Matter of Course
A few courts have suggested a standard for the award of attor-
ney's fees in social security appeals that would award fees virtually as a
matter of course to claimants who pursue successful appeals. For these
courts, resolution of the appeal without a hearing through a motion for
summary judgment creates a presumption that the agency position on
appeal lacked substantial justification. In Berman v. Schweiker,188 for
example, the district court cited the disposition of the appeal by sum-
mary judgment as one justification for an award of fees; the govern-
ment had been found, as a matter of law, to be defending an erroneous
position."8"
Berman, however, concerned the interpretation of the tax status of
a claimant. The facts were uncontested. No credibility determination or
weighing of evidence underlay the agency decision. When evidentiary
evaluations by the Agency provide the basis for the administrative de-
termination, the suggestion that reversal of the Agency on summary
judgment creates a presumption that the Agency acted without sub-
stantial justification must be rejected.190
If a lack of substantial justification could be presumed from the
mode of disposition of appeals from adverse claims for social security
benefits, fees would be awarded as a matter of course. Since the district
187. Lonning v. Schweiker, 568 F. Supp. 1079, 1083 (E.D. Pa. 1983), citing Dougherty v.
Lehman, 711 F.2d 555, 564 (3d Cir. 1983).
188. 531 F. Supp. 1149 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff'd, 713 F.2d 1290 (7th Cir. 1983).
189. Id. at 1154. Cf. Moholland v. Schweiker, 546 F. Supp. 383, 386 (D.N.H. 1982) (ruling
against government creates presumption that fees are awardable).
190. See, e.g., Washington v. Heckler, 573 F. Supp. 1567, 1570 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Bennett v.
Schweiker, 543 F. Supp. 897, 898 (D.D.C. 1982).
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court hears no evidence, but only reviews the administrative record,
these appeals are, as a matter of routine, disposed of by cross-motions
for summary judgment. Unless the Equal Access to Justice Act was
intended to award fees to all claimants who prevail on the appeal of
their claim to federal court, a summary judgment must create no pre-
sumption in favor of fees.191
2. The "No Evidence" Standard
Courts seeking a clearly definable standard by which to determine
eligibility for a fee award under the Equal Access to Justice Act fre-
quently have questioned whether any evidence was presented at the ad-
ministrative hearing that might have supported the Agency on the ap-
peal of the denial of a claim. These courts have held that the presence
of no such evidence, or of essentially no evidence, indicates that the
Agency was without substantial justification in defending the position
of the appeals council before the district court on review.
In Wolverton v. Schweiker,192 for example, the denial of disability
benefits by the Agency was predicated on evidence that work was avail-
able for a claimant who retained a residual function capacity to per-
form light or sedentary work. On appeal from the agency determina-
tion, the district court first remanded the claim, finding no evidence
that the claimant could, in fact, perform work at this exertion level. At
a hearing pursuant to the remand order, no evidence to show the claim-
ant's residual functional capacity was elicited; nonetheless, the Agency
again denied benefits. On this second review, the court reversed out-
right. The court adhered to the principle that a finding that the Secre-
tary's decision was not supported by substantial evidence did not neces-
sitate a finding of lack of substantial justification for the Secretary's
position. Nonetheless, it found that there was no evidence to support
the decision of the Agency. Attorney's fees were awarded. 9
When, as in Wolverton, there is no evidence to support an essential
element of the denial of disability that was appealed, a fee award is
easily justified. 9 The more difficult case is presented by those deci-
sions in which some evidence was present to support the agency's denial
191. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
192. 533 F. Supp. 420 (D. Idaho 1982), rev'd in part sub nor. Wolverton v. Heckler, 726
F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1984).
193. Id. at 426.
194. See also Moholland v. Schweiker, 546 F. Supp. 383 (D.N.H. 1982). However, a fee
award may be rejected if the lack of evidence to support the Agency's decision is the result of the
actions of the claimant. See Wolverton v. Heckler, 726 F.2d 580, 583 (9th Cir. 1984).
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of benefits.
Thus, in Hornal v. Schweiker,196 fees were awarded because there
was "essentially no evidence" to support the denial of benefits by the
Agency. The court noted that, in its decision on the merits of the ap-
peal, it had found that the only medical evidence in support of the gov-
ernment position was that of a doctor who had performed a single, cur-
sory examination. The court contrasted his examination to the far more
thorough examination of another doctor who had found evidence of dis-
ability. Had the two physicians been equally qualified, the court indi-
cated, or had they examined the claimant for the same period of time
or given similar tests, they might have reached different conclusions. In
that case, the court indicated, there would have been substantial justifi-
cation for the government's position even if the court had found a lack
of substantial evidence to support the Agency.19
This reasoning seems facially persuasive: If the reversal was
merely a matter of the court reaching a different conclusion than the
Agency concerning the significance of the evidence, fees should be de-
nied. The example the court presents for a denial of fees, however, can
never arise. If the court had found that the physicians' reports were
equally valid, it could not have reversed the Agency on the merits. It is
the function of the Agency, not of the court, to weigh the evidence. The
court may only review to determine whether the agency's position was
supported by substantial evidence. Had the reports of both doctors in
Hornal constituted substantial evidence, and had the Agency accepted
as more credible a report indicating qn absence of a disabling condi-
tion, the court would have been obligated to affirm the denial of bene-
fits. 1 97 No fee question would have arisen.
Implicitly, then, the court in Hornal indicated that if no substan-
tial evidence supports the Agency, the court must find that there was a
lack of substantial justification for the agency's position. The threshold
it suggests for denial of fees, a rough balance of the evidence, cannot
occur if the court ruled correctly on the underlying appeal. In any case
where the claimant prevails on appeal there cannot be evidence of legal
significance in the record that persuasively supports the agency's posi-
tion. That evidence would constitute substantial evidence and preclude
reversal. If the Agency is reversed on appeal, the balance of the evi-
dence must resemble that present in Hornal or Wolverton: an utter
195. 551 F. Supp. 612 (M.D. Tenn. 1982).
196. Id. at 617-18. See also Kauffman v. Schweiker, 559 F. Supp. 372, 375-76 (M.D. Pa.
1983) (adopting reasoning of Hornal).
197. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
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failure of proof on the part of the Agency.
In several reported decisions, claimants seeking compensation
under the Equal Access to Justice Act have been denied fees because
"some evidence" was present to support the agency's denial of benefits.
In these decisions, either the decision of the court on the merits of the
appeal or on the denial of attorney's fees may be questioned.
One example of the difficulty presented by application of a "some
evidence" standard is Jones v. Schweiker.198 Although paying homage
to a standard of "reasonableness," the court applied a stricter test:
[T]he court believes that rarely will a plaintiff in a social security case
be able to meet the EAJA standard. Unless the government has no
authority for its position, or the record reveals no evidence to support
the AL's findings, the government generally will be justified in de-
fending an appeal to the district court. 9'
Under this standard, the court denied an award of fees. It noted that it
had reversed the agency's decision to deny social security benefits be-
cause, although the administrative law judge had placed great weight
on the conclusions of an agency doctor, the court found his conclusions
to conflict with "overall conclusions to be drawn from the record."200
The issue on appeal, the court held, was an "analysis of the record as a
whole and the weight to be given certain evidence."20 1 The court re-
versed the Agency on appeal, but there had been some support for the
agency's position. No fee was justified, the court held.202
The role of the court, however, is not to weigh evidence on an
administrative appeal. The appeal is not de novo. If any weight was to
be given to the report on which the Agency ruled, the court should not
have reversed the Agency in the first instance. The court in Jones ap-
parently conceded that it stepped beyond that role, and weighed evi-
dence on appeal. If it erred in this manner on the initial review of the
administrative decision, substantial justification for the agency's posi-
tion is present not because some evidence supported an erroneous deci-
sion, but rather because the Agency was erroneously reversed on
appeal.
Application of a standard that would deny attorney's fees because
"some evidence" was present can lead to tenuous results even when the
court did not reweigh evidence on the underlying appeal. In Cornella v.
198. 565 F. Supp. 52 (W.D. Mich. 1983).
199. Id. at 56.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. See also Kerr v. Heckler, 575 F. Supp. 455, 458 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
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Schweiker, 0 3 the district court denied benefits because it found that
some evidence of the claimant's ability to work had been present. 04
This decision was reversed on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit. The district court on the underlying appeal from a de-
nial of social security benefits found that this work activity evidence
was not substantial when compared to the whole record.205 In its fee
decision, the district court distinguished Wolverton, in which "no" evi-
dence had been present.20 However, the reported decision of the under-
lying appeal indicates that the critical omission from the administrative
record in Cornelia was virtually indistinguishable from that in Wolver-
ton. In both cases, reversal was mandated because a denial of benefits
arose from testimony by a vocational expert predicated on an assumed
exertional capacity. Insufficient evidence was present in each case to
support the vocational expert's assumptions concerning the claimant's
exertional capacity. 07 While Wolverton focused on this lack of evi-
dence in support of a critical element of proof of nondisability, 08 the
decision on fees by the district court in Cornelia looked to evidence
unrelated to the vocational expert's testimony to find justification for
the position of the Agency.20 9
The government carries the burden of proof. Once it is shown that
the claimant cannot return to his previous occupation,21 0 and if its
proof fails on any element, the presence of "some evidence" to prove an
unrelated issue cannot be relevant to a fee petition. Evidence virtually
always will be present to support some elements of the agency's benefit
denial.2 1' If the "no evidence" standard is as strictly applied as sug-
gested by the district court in Cornelia, fees will only be awarded if the
Agency acted in utter disregard of uncontroverted proof of disability.
This is not the result intended by Congress.212
203. 553 F. Supp. 240 (D.S.D. 1982), rev'd, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1984).
204. Id. at 244.
205. Cornelia v. Schweiker, 545 F. Supp. 918 (D.S.D. 1982).
206. 553 F. Supp. at 244.
207. Wolverton, 533 F. Supp. at 425; Cornelia, 545 F. Supp. at 930-32.
208. 533 F. Supp. at 425.
209. 553 F. Supp. at 244. On appeal, the court of appeals held that the Agency did not act
reasonably if it relied on isolated evidence and ignored the overwhelming evidence of disability in
denying the claim. Cornelia v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978, 984 (8th Cir. 1984).
210. See supra note 40.
211. Cf. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (1983) (sequential evaluation of disability claims).
212. See Cornelia, 553 F. Supp. at 243 (substantial justification standard a "middle ground"
between automatic award and award for governmental bad faith). Compare Jones v. Schweiker,
565 F. Supp. 52, 56 (W.D. Mich. 1983), and Wolverton v. Schweiker, 533 F. Supp. 420, 425 n.14
(D. Idaho 1982) (awards under the Equal Access to Justice Act would be rare), rev'd in part sub
noma. Wolverton v. Heckler, 726 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1984), with Zimmerman v. Schweiker, 575 F.
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3. The "Reasonableness" Standard
Not only have courts asked if any evidence were present in the
record to justify a denial of fees. They have sought to evaluate "sub-
stantial justification" for the position of the Social Security Adminis-
tration on appeal from administrative determinations by examining the
reasonableness of the agency's position. For example, in Vega v.
Schweiker,21 3 an attorney's fee was awarded under the Equal Access to
Justice Act to a claimant who obtained remand to the Agency for a
further evidentiary hearing. The claimant was non-English speaking,
essentially uneducated, and unrepresented. The record, the court held,
"clearly established" the need for remand. Even if a mere "reasonable-
ness" standard were applied, the court held, a fee would be awarded. 14
"Reasonable," as applied in Vega, is adherence to established law
of the controlling federal circuit court by the Social Security Adminis-
tration in decisions from administrative hearings.2 15 The unreasonable
behavior of the Agency in failing to apply applicable law repeatedly
has resulted in attorney's fee awards following reversal or remand of
agency adjudications. 216 These decisions have relied on an inability to
justify the legal basis for the agency's action, rather than a failure of
the proof presented to the Agency.
A test of reasonableness, however, has been applied not only to the
legal standard advocated by the Agency, but to the quantum of evi-
dence in the agency record. 1 7 That the government position is "argua-
bly defensible,"21 8 or that resolution of a genuine factual dispute is a
Supp. 1436, 1440 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) ("If successful claimants' fees were denied simply because
some elements of the government's position were genuine, there would be few awards and little
additional incentive for those claimants who might otherwise not contest an adverse
determination.").
213. 558 F. Supp. 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
214. Id. at 54.
215. See Vega v. Schweiker, 549 F. Supp. 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (decision on the merits of
the appeal for social security benefits).
216. E.g., Phillips v. Heckler, 574 F. Supp. 870 (W.D.N.C. 1983) (failure to follow mandate
of court on remand); Ceglia v. Schweiker, 566 F. Supp. 118 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (failure to weigh
medical evidence properly). See Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978, 983-85 (8th Cir. 1984)
("reasonable basis in fact and law" lacking to support Agency decision).
217. Washington v. Heckler, 573 F. Supp. 1567, 1571-73 (E.D. Pa. 1983). Courts frequently
have required that the government show reasonableness in both law and fact. E.g., Ceglia v.
Schweiker, 566 F. Supp. 118, 123 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); Hornal v. Schweiker, 551 F. Supp. 612, 617
(M.D. Tenn. 1982). It has also been suggested that the test is whether there is a reasonable basis
in law or fact for the government position. Chee v. Schweiker, 563 F. Supp. 1362, 1364 (D. Ariz.
1983).
218. Guthrie v. Schweiker, 718 F.2d 104, 108 (4th Cir. 1983).
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"close call,"219 however, are not standards susceptible of easy determi-
nation. Such labels offer no guide by which the propriety of a fee
award may be measured.
To articulate the factors justifying the government position, the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Dougherty v. Lehman,2 0 set
out a three-part test of reasonableness. Under this analysis, the court
first must determine that a reasonable basis in truth existed for the
allegations of the pleadings; then that a reasonable basis in law existed
for the legal theory advanced to support the government position; and
finally that the facts alleged supported the theory presented. Only if the
government proved each of these requirements was its position substan-
tially justified.221
This analysis was applied to the review of a social security claim in
Lonning v. Schweiker 22 Conceding that it had some difficulty strictly
applying this three-part test to administrative appeals, the court in
Lonning granted a fee award. The evidence, the court held, did not
provide a reasonable basis in truth for termination of benefits. The
facts that existed did not support a legal finding of no disability.2 3
As with courts applying a "no evidence" test, however, the court in
Lonning stepped outside its proper role. It reweighed the evidence. To
reverse the termination of disability benefits, it had rejected credibility
findings concerning the reports of examining physicians. These reports
indicated no disability was present. Because "corroborating, occupation
related evidence" was not in the record, the court found that the first
prong of the Dougherty test had not been met.2 24 This analysis is indis-
tinguishable from the quantum of evidence analysis suggested by courts
using the "no evidence" standard. A "reasonable basis in truth" under
this analysis is coextensive with the presence of evidence to support the
denial of benefits. As did the court in Wolverton, the court in Lonning
demanded some evidence of each element that the government has the
219. Ulrich v. Schweiker, 548 F. Supp. 63, 66 (D. Idaho 1982). In Zimmerman v.
Schweiker, 575 F. Supp. 1436, 1439-40 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), the court cast a "reasonableness" in-
quiry in terms of whether reasonable private counsel would have advised his client to proceed,
after evaluating the merits of the case. This approach should achieve similar results to the analysis
suggested below: fees will not be awarded if the government presents a creditable legal theory
supported by substantial evidence.
220. 711 F.2d 555 (3d Cir. 1983).
221. Id. at 564. See United States v. Kungys, 575 F. Supp. 1208 (D.N.J. 1983) (Dougherty
test applied to court proceeding involving evidentiary hearing).
222. 568 F. Supp. 1079 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
223. Id. at 1083-85.
224. Id. at 1084.
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burden to prove."'
Applying the third prong of the Dougherty test, the court in Lon-
ning held that, even if a reasonable basis in truth for the facts con-
tained in the administrative record was presupposed, the facts did not
"support a legal finding of no disability." '226 If, however, it is on this
arm of Dougherty that fees are awarded in appeals from the Social
Security Administration, then all successful appeals from adverse ad-
ministrative decisions must give rise to a fee award. If there is no sub-
stantial evidence to support the Agency's decision, there must not have
been facts in the Agency record to support any valid theory for denial
of benefits.
The first prong of the Dougherty test presumes that allegations of
fact will appear in the pleadings. The pleadings in a social security
appeal merely consist of allegations of the existence of administrative
proceedings, and conclusory statements as to the legal significance of
the evidence adduced in those proceedings. Lonning strives to apply the
first prong of Dougherty by seeking a reasonable basis of truth for the
agency decision to terminate benefits, but concedes that this becomes a
mixed question of fact and law, not strictly a question of fact.227 But if
the first prong is inapplicable, and the third prong makes reversal of
the underlying claim a virtual predicate for a fee award, the Dougherty
analysis, like other tests of reasonableness, fails when applied to admin-
istrative appeals under the Social Security Act.228
4. Creditable Legal Theories Supported by Substantial Evidence
Dougherty v. Lehman provides an attractive analysis for most fee
claims under the Equal Access to Justice Act. Can it be better applied
225. See supra notes 192-94, 201-07 and accompanying text.
226. 568 F. Supp. at 1084 n.5.
227. Id.
228. In Washington v. Heckler, 573 F. Supp. 1567, 1570-71 (E.D. Pa. 1983), the court noted
the difficulties in applying Dougherty to administrative proceedings. In such proceedings, the court
must decide if reasonable minds could disagree whether the Agency conduct was supported by
substantial evidence.
If, after considering the original agency determination and its relationship to the law as
it then existed, the court is convinced that the government was unreasonable in proceed-
ing to litigation, an award of attorney's fees is warranted. If, on the other hand, the
court . . . determines that, by a narrow margin, the agency's decision lacked a substan-
tial basis, such an award would be improper.
Id. at 1571. This effectively dispenses with the three-part analysis of Dougherty; the test is one of
reasonableness of the Agency's decision. The court in Washington found the Agency had a reason-
able basis in fact for a denial of benefits. In so doing, it implicitly conceded to reweighing the
evidence in reversing the decision to deny benefits. Id. at 1571-73.
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to social security appeals than Lonning suggests? The three-part
Dougherty standard cannot be applied to administrative appeals. But
Dougherty provides a framework by which a court may consider a
claim for attorney's fees arising out of a social security claim.
This first hurdle that the government must meet under Dougherty
is to show that there is a reasonable basis in truth for the facts alleged
in its pleadings. This hurdle simply is inapplicable to an appeal from an
administrative record. The facts advanced in the pleadings will be only
that administrative proceedings took place. It is the legal significance of
the evidence taken in the course of these proceedings that is the focus
of the litigation arising out of the complaint for administrative review.
The complaint and answer will assert differing conclusions of law to be
drawn from the evidence presented to the Agency, but there will be no
factual dispute in the pleadings.
Nor can the first step of the Dougherty test be applied to the evi-
dence adduced in the agency proceedings. Although some of this evi-
dence may have been developed at the behest of the agency, it does not
constitute facts adopted or advanced by the agency. The evidence con-
sists of medical reports, vocational reports, and testimony of witnesses
at the administrative hearing.22 9 Some evidence will favor a finding in
favor of the claimant; other evidence will militate against it. By itself,
this body of evidence cannot be analogized to facts asserted in
pleadings.
It has been suggested that the decision of the administrative law
judge represents the facts described in the first part of the Dougherty
test. 30 In deciding the claim, the administrative law judge makes find-
ings of fact from the evidence. Arguably, by choosing to litigate, the
Agency adopts the administrative law judge's findings and asserts their
reasonable basis in fact.
To ask whether the findings of the judge have such a reasonable
basis, however, is only to reinquire as to whether substantial evidence
supported the Agency decision denying benefits. If there is substantial
evidence to support the findings of the administrative law judge, the
findings have a reasonable basis. If there is no substantial evidence,
there can be no reasonable basis in fact to support these findings.2 '
The second inquiry Dougherty recommends to a court considering
229. See supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text.
230. See Washington v. Heckler, 573 F. Supp. 1567, 1571 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
231. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 703 F.2d 700, 719 (3d Cir. 1983)
(Hunter, J., dissenting); Washington v. Heckler, 573 F. Supp. 1567, 1570-71 (E.D. Pa. 1983);
Operating Eng'rs Local Union No. 3 v. Bohn, 541 F. Supp. 486, 495 (D. Utah 1982).
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a fee award is whether there was a reasonable basis in law for the legal
theory advanced by the government. It is here that the analysis of a
claim for attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act in so-
cial security litigation must begin. If the government advocates an un-
reasonable legal theory, fees should be awarded to a prevailing party.232
If, conversely, the legal theory advanced is creditable, the court should
proceed to examine the facts supporting the Agency decision.233
When does the Agency advance an unreasonable theory of law?
With one notable exception,2 34 courts have agreed that fees should be
awarded under the Equal Access to Justice Act when the government
advances a theory that patently is contrary to controlling precedent.23 5
Fee awards rendered because the Agency position was "unreasonable"
or "made without evidence" may better be understood if consideration
is given to the authority supporting the legal theory advanced by the
Agency on appeal. 2 6
Concern has been expressed with the policy of nonacquiesence
adopted by the Social Security Administration. 3 7 By this policy, the
Agency applies its own interpretation of the Social Security Act to all
claimants, even if the district or circuit court having jurisdiction over
an appeal from denial of a claimant's social security benefits has
adopted a contrary interpretation of the law. 8 If the controlling
court23 9 has recently and definitively spoken on an issue, there can be
232. See, e.g., Phillips v. Heckler, 574 F. Supp. 870, 872 (W.D.N.C. 1983) (failure to follow
order of court on remand).
233. See, e.g., Cornelia v. Schweiker, 553 F. Supp. 240, 244 (D.S.D. 1982) (evidence would
support nondisability finding under analysis used in other circuits), rev'd, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.
1984).
234. Wyandotte Savings Bank v. NLRB, 682 F.2d 119, 120 (6th Cir. 1982) ("a reasonable
attempt to reopen a closed question").
235. See Cornelia v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978, 984-85 (8th Cir. 1984); Ceglia v. Schweiker,
566 F. Supp. 118, 124 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); San Filippo v. Secretary of Health and Human Services,
564 F. Supp. 173, 175 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); Chee v. Schweiker, 563 F. Supp. 1362, 1365 (D. Ariz.
1983). Cf. Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1908
(1984) (consider strength of government's argument that extant law permits result in its favor).
236. See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text.
237. Hillhouse v. Harris, 715 F.2d 428, 430 (8th Cir. 1983); Lopez v. Heckler, 572 F. Supp.
26, 30 (C.D. Cal.), stay denied, 713 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir.), partial stay granted, 104 S. Ct. 10
(Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), application to vacate partial stay denied, 104 S. Ct. 221 (1983).
238. See Lopez v. Heckler, 572 F. Supp. 26, 28 & n.7 (C.D. Cal.), stay denied, 713 F.2d
1432 (9th Cir.), partial stay granted, 104 S. Ct. 10 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), application to
vacate partial stay denied, 104 S. Ct. 221 (1983); Chee v. Schweiker, 563 F. Supp. 1362, 1365
(D. Ariz. 1983).
239. "Controlling court" refers to the federal district court in which a social security appeal
is docketed, the federal court of appeals to which appeal from that district would run, and the
United States Supreme Court.
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no reasonable basis for opposing the court's interpretation of law.
Claimants whose benefits have been denied because of the refusal
of the Social Security Administration to accept the interpretation of
social security law adopted by the claimant's circuit are precisely the
victims of unreasonable government action that the Equal Access to
Justice Act was designed to aid. Conversely, the policy of nonac-
quiesence, suggested to be contumacious by at least one circuit
judge, 40 is the type of government conduct that the Act seeks to deter.
Certainly, the government should be deterred from defending such be-
havior on appeal to the district courts. 41 If the government does liti-
gate, fees should be awarded to prevailing claimants.242
A closer question is presented when there is no settled law in the
controlling court. The government should not be dissuaded from ad-
vancing novel, well-founded legal theories.24 3 If precedent exists for the
Agency's position in other circuits, there is a reasonable basis for the
government position.2" Similarly, the Agency may reasonably advocate
a theory if no circuit has spoken on the theory and it is advanced in
good faith. In these cases, no attorney's fee should be awarded under
the Equal Access to Justice Act. If the Agency advocates a theory ad-
verse to settled law in other courts, however, it cannot be said that
there was substantial justification for the government position."" The
government may wish to encourage the adoption of the unprecedented
position in the court, but it cannot reasonably require the claimant to
bear his own counsel fees when it fails to convince the court to adopt its
interpretation of the law. 2"
240. Hillhouse v. Harris, 715 F.2d 428, 430 (8th Cir. 1983) (McMillian, J., concurring).
241. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text. It has been suggested that nonacquies-
cence justifies an award of attorney's fees under the "bad faith" standard of common law, as
permitted by 28 U.S.C. § 2412(c)(2) (Supp. V 1981). See Chee v. Schweiker, 563 F. Supp. 1362,
1365 (D. Ariz. 1983).
242. Chee v. Schweiker, 563 F. Supp. 1362, 1365 (D. Ariz. 1983); San Filippo v. Secretary
of Health and Human Services, 564 F. Supp. 173, 175 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). But see Kirkland v.
Railroad Retirement Bd., 706 F.2d 99, 104-05 (2d Cir. 1983) (agency position supported by deci-
sion in several other circuits, fee award denied). A fee may not be appropriate if the parties were
unaware of the error of law underlying the Agency position. See Bennett v. Schweiker, 543 F.
Supp. 897, 898-99 (D.D.C. 1982) (relying on prelitigation position of Agency).
243. McDonald v. Schweiker, 551 F. Supp. 327, 333 (N.D. Ind. 1982), rev'd, 726 F.2d 311
(7th Cir. 1984); Moholland v. Schweiker, 546 F. Supp. 383, 386 (D.N.H. 1982). In McDonald v.
Schweiker, 726 F.2d 311, 316 (7th Cir. 1983), the court indicated that the government must have
a "solid though not necessarily correct basis in fact and law" to avoid fee liability.
244. Kirkland v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 706 F.2d 99, 104-05 (2d Cir. 1983); Cornella v.
Schweiker, 553 F. Supp. 240, 244 (D.S.D. 1982), rev'd, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1984).
245. See Ceglia v. Schweiker, 566 F. Supp. 118, 124 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
246. See Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
1908 (1984).
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Thus, when the federal district court in which a social security
appeal is docketed has previously rejected the legal theory upon which
the agency relies for affirmance, an award of attorney's fees is appro-
priate if the claimant prevails . 4 7 Similarly, a fee is mandated if the
Agency unsuccessfully relies on a legal theory previously rejected by
the controlling circuit, by the Supreme Court, or by the great weight of
authority outside of the controlling circuit.2 4 8 But if the controlling
court has not spoken on the issue, and a strong argument can be made
for the legal theory advocated by the Agency, a fee should not be
awarded without further examination.2 49 This should particularly be
true when precedent from other courts supports the Agency. In these
cases, the government advances a reasonable legal position.
If the government is found to have advocated a legal theory having
a reasonable basis in law, the final step in the Dougherty analysis is to
inquire whether the facts alleged reasonably support the legal theory
advanced. In an administrative appeal, the "facts alleged" may reason-
ably be analogized to the facts adduced in the course of the Agency
proceedings.25 0 The issue in applying Dougherty to administrative pro-
ceedings is whether the evidence of legal significance in the Agency
record can support the legal standard advanced by the Agency on ap-
peal. Thus, if there is some evidence to support the legal theory of the
government, and the court finds that there was a reasonable basis in
law for the Agency to advocate that theory, a fee award should be
denied. If the evidence fails under controlling case law or any other
creditable legal theory, however, the administrative record cannot pro-
vide a reasonable basis in fact for the legal theory.
For example, the facts adduced cannot reasonably support the le-
gal theory advanced when the reviewing court imposes a legal standard
on the Agency and remands the claim with instruction to reevaluate
the evidence in light of that standard, but the Agency fails to do so. In
effect, the Agency rejects the law of the case. If it fails to obtain evi-
dence relevant to the interpretation of law made by the reviewing
court, and the denial of benefits ultimately is reversed for lack of sub-
stantial evidence to support a finding under applicable law, there can-
not be a reasonable basis in fact to support the legal conclusions drawn
247. See Wolverton v. Schweiker, 533 F. Supp. 420, 425 (D. Idaho 1982) (failure to follow
instructions on remand), rev'd in part sub nom. Wolverton v. Heckler, 726 F.2d 580 (9th Cir.
1984).
248. See Underwood v. Pierce, 547 F. Supp. 256, 261-62 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
249. See Broad Ave. Laundry & Tailoring v. United States, 693 F.2d 1387, 1392 (Fed. Cir.
1982).
250. See Lonning v. Schweiker, 568 F. Supp. 1079, 1084 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
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by the Agency. 51
The failure of the record to support the Agency's position on the
law may stem from the refusal of the Agency to acquiesce to court
rulings concerning the significance of evidence. Some circuits have
held, for example, that reports of "one-shot doctors," physicians who
only make one brief examination of the claimant, cannot be substantial
evidence in the face of contrary findings by treating physicians. 52 If
the Agency relies on the findings of the examining physician to support
its legal theory, it fails to meet the final test of justification. The evi-
dence on which it relies, lacking legal significance, cannot support the
Agency's position. 5
To show that the facts alleged reasonably support the legal theory
advanced, the Agency must show substantial evidence to support its
interpretation of the Social Security Act. Once it is established that the
legal theory of the Agency was reasonably advanced, then the Agency
must show that it would have been entitled to an affirmance of its ad-
ministrative determination if the court had accepted its interpretation
of the law. If the Agency cannot muster from the record the substantial
evidence needed to support its administrative decision, the Agency did
not reasonably defend its action on appeal.2
54
G. Common-Law Exceptions
To date, only a single decision of a federal district court 25 5 has
awarded a fee after invoking section 2412(b) of the Equal Access to
251. See Moholland v. Schweiker, 546 F. Supp. 383 (D.N.H. 1982); Wolverton v.
Schweiker, 533 F. Supp. 420 (D. Idaho 1982), rev'd in part sub nom. Wolverton v. Heckler, 726
F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1984).
252. See, e.g., McGhee v. Harris, 683 F.2d 256, 259 (8th Cir. 1982); Allen v. Weinberger,
552 F.2d 781, 786 (7th Cir. 1977).
253. See Ceglia v. Schweiker, 566 F. Supp. 118 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). The Agency decision is
based on evidence not accorded the significance mandated by the prior interpretations of the con-
trolling courts. Presumably, a court that awarded attorney's fees only if "no evidence" supported
the Agency would deny fees in such a case. See Jones v. Schweiker, 565 F. Supp. 52 (W.D. Mich.
1983). But the Social Security Administration is equally unreasonable when it defends on appeal
Agency determinations that fail to apply evidentiary rules adopted by the controlling courts as
when it defends determinations that fail to apply substantive interpretations of social security law
adopted by those same courts. Fees should be awardable in both cases.
254. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text. Under the analysis suggested here,
however, a fee award will not be required whenever the Agency is reversed on appeal. Considera-
tion first is given to the legal theory advanced by the Agency. The court will reverse the.Agency if
there is not substantial evidence to support the Agency determination under the legal analysis
adopted by the court. But if there is evidence to support a creditable alternate legal theory ad-
vanced by the Agency, fees will be denied.
255. Chee v. Schweiker, 563 F. Supp. 1362, 1365 (D. Ariz. 1983).
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Justice Act.2 56 Under this section, fees may be awarded against the
United States to the same extent that a private party would be lia-
ble. 5 7 The award is discretionary.5 8 Insofar as section 2412(b) creates
a right to fees if the government litigates in "bad faith," '259 it is eclipsed
by the provisions of the Act that permit fees if the government is una-
ble to show that its position is substantially justified. 26  But because it
is not subject to the sunset provision of the remainder of the Act,26" '
and because it may authorize a fee even if the government position is
substantially justified, 62 section 2412(b) has independent significance.
Although the government propounded a creditable legal theory,
fees may be awarded under the common benefit or common fund ex-
ception to the American rule.2 6 This exception, however, is of little use
to a litigant appealing from the denial of social security benefits. Adop-
tion of the interpretation of law that the claimant urges on appeal may
benefit large numbers of claimants,26 4 but the beneficiaries are not an
identifiable class. 6 Only through the processing of individual claims
256. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1982).
257. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
258. "Unless expressly prohibited by statute, a court may award reasonable fees and ex-
penses of attorneys ...." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (Supp. V 1981) (emphasis added). See Prema-
chandra v. Mitts, 727 F.2d 717, 723-24 (8th Cir. 1984).
259. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
260. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (Supp. V 1981). See H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 14, at 14,
1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4993 (substantial justification a middle ground between
automatic fee award and an award if government action "arbitrary, frivolous, unreasonable, or
groundless"); cf. Bennett v. Schweiker, 543 F. Supp. 897 (D.D.C. 1982) (neither lack of substan-
tial justification nor bad faith shown).
261. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 note (1982).
262. Fees may be paid as at common law to a prevailing party. There is no provision under
section 2412(b) by which the government may avoid liability for fees if its position was justified.
Fees paid are to be "reasonable," with no stated limitation on the hourly rate used to calculate the
fee. A claim for fees may be made within a reasonable time from final judgment; the 30 day
limitation from final judgment of section 2412(d) does not apply. McQuiston v. Marsh, 707 F.2d
1082, 1085 (9th Cir. 1983).
263. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
264. In Ocasio v. Schweiker, 540 F. Supp. 1320, 1321 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), for example, the
Agency revised an interpretation of widow's insurance benefits, 42 U.S.C. § 402(e) (1982), by
stipulation in the course of the appeal. In Chee v. Schweiker, 563 F. Supp. 1362, 1363 (D. Ariz.
1983), the claimant sought to require that the Agency show improvement in his condition prior to
terminating benefits, as mandated by Finnegan v. Matthews, 641 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1981).
Some 34,000 individuals affected by the Agency nonacquiesence in Finnegan had received notice
as class members in litigation concerning the same issue. See Heckler v. Lopez, 104 S. Ct. 10, 11
(Rehnquist, Circuit Justice) (granting partial application for stay), application to vacate partial
stay denied, 104 S. Ct. 221 (1983).
265. See Stevens v. Municipal Court, 603 F.2d 111, 112-13 (9th Cir. 1979) (fees denied
under common benefit exception due to lack of showing of identity and number of a class of
indigents denied counsel in a municipal court).
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are the beneficiaries ascertainable. Furthermore, the claimant's litiga-
tion will not have created or augmented a common fund.26 6 Individual
claimants may be able to claim social security benefits that would not
otherwise be available to them, but the fund from which these benefits
are to be drawn will only be increased through legislative action. In any
event, an award of fees to a successful litigant will not effectively shift
the burden of fees to the nonlitigating beneficiaries, as is the goal of the
common benefit or common fund exception.26 7 Rather, the expenses of
the fee will be born equally by all claimants, benefited or not, as a cost
of administering social security. 6 8
The bad faith exception of the American rule, however, can be
triggered in social security appeals. In Chee v. Schweiker,6 9 the court
suggested that the Agency policy of nonacquiesence exhibits bad faith
and creates a right to fees. Of course, the Agency may in good faith
attempt to modify existing law. But if it is Agency policy, in the face of
a settled interpretation of law that would compel a finding of disability,
to force claimants to litigate appeals from benefit denials, the Agency
exhibits bad faith. This is particularly true if the Agency repeatedly
has declined to appeal the interpretation of law to an ultimate resolu-
tion, as when it will not seek Supreme Court review of adverse deci-
sions from the court of appeals of a circuit that has adopted a position
contrary to the Agency's interpretation of the law.270
Fees should also be awarded if the Agency is obdurate in following
the orders of a reviewing court. If the Agency declines to appeal from
an order of remand,2 71 but refuses to apply the interpretation of law
adopted by the court in the remand order, 72 it exhibits bad faith. Simi-
larly, it acts in bad faith when payment of fees pursuant to the reversal
of an Agency decision is only obtained following repeated litigation. 273
266. See Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 543 & n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 1908 (1984); McQuiston v. Marsh, 707 F.2d 1082, 1085 (9th Cir. 1983).
267. See Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392-94 (1970).
268. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(4)(A) (1982).
269. 563 F. Supp. 1362, 1365 (D. Ariz. 1983).
270. Cf. Lopez v. Heckler, 572 F. Supp. 26 (C.D. Cal.), stay denied, 713 F.2d 1432 (9th
Cir.), partial stay granted, 104 S. Ct. 10 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), application to vacate par-
tial stay denied, 104 S. Ct. 221 (1983); Hillhouse v. Harris, 547 F. Supp. 88, 92 (W.D. Ark.
1982), affd, 715 F.2d 428 (8th Cir. 1983).
271. A remand order involving an interpretation of law is appealable. See Gold v. Wein-
berger, 473 F.2d 1376 (5th Cir. 1973); Cohen v. Perales, 412 F.2d 44, 48 (5th Cir. 1969), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
272. See, e.g., Moholland v. Schweiker, 546 F. Supp. 383 (D.N.H. 1982).
273. Webb v. Harris, 88 F.R.D. 170 (N.D. II1. 1980) (awarding fees as penalty at common
law). Webb predates the Equal Access to Justice Act. The Act clarifies the right to an award of
fees against the government in such a situation.
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If contempt proceedings are taken against the Agency in connection
with the appeal of a claim, a fee clearly is warranted. 74
V. CONCLUSION
Petitions for attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act
arising from social security appeals can be evaluated using a two-step
analysis. This analysis provides a meaningful tool for controlling unrea-
sonable actions by the Social Security Administration. First, the court
should consider whether a creditable legal theory was advanced on ap-
peal by the Agency. If there is no such theory, a fee award is man-
dated. If there was a reasonable legal theory advanced for affirmance
of the Agency, the court must then determine whether there was sub-
stantial evidence of legal significance in the record to support that the-
ory. Fees should be awarded if no such evidence is present.
The Act must be applied to the position of the Agency in civil
litigation in the courts, not its actions during the administrative pro-
cess. No fees, therefore, should accrue merely because the government
answers the complaint that initiates a social security appeal. Once the
Agency obtains the transcript of the Agency proceedings, however, it
must determine if it can reasonably defend the Agency's determination
on review. If it cannot, it should expeditiously confess error. If it fails
to do so, and needlessly requires the claimant to litigate his appeal,
attorney's fees should be awarded under the Act.
The claimant must have prevailed before a fee can be awarded. If
his appeal is remanded to the Agency, he should only be eligible for
fees is he ultimately prevails on his claim. Once he does so, he may
petition for fees for all of his work in the district court. Those fees
should be awarded employing the same standard used upon outright
reversal of the Social Security Administration.
Applying this analysis, courts can vindicate the purposes of the
Act in administrative appeals such as those arising under the Social
Security Act, Mere reversal of the Agency will not give rise to a fee
award. But the government will be required to show that its position on
the appeal was substantially justified in law and fact. If it chooses to
litigate a position against settled authority or unsupported by evidence
in the record, it will bear the expense of the claimant's counsel.
274. See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967); cf.
Hillhouse v. Harris, 715 F.2d 428, 430 (8th Cir. 1983) (McMillian, J., concurring).
1984]

